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Abstract 
 
Rural development has been a part of South Africa’s policy agenda since the country’s transition to 
democracy, but it has enjoyed new prominence since the ANC’s policy conference at Polokwane in 
2007 (ANC, 2008). This renewed interest in rural development as a policy priority culminated in the 
establishment of the new Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and the adoption of 
its flagship strategy, the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), in 2009. 
 Even in its earliest incarnations, rural development was classified as a crosscutting policy 
problem beyond the scope of a single South African government department, therefore requiring 
horizontal coordination across sectors like land reform and agriculture, as well as vertical 
coordination with provincial departments serving concurrent functions. On the vertical plane, local 
government is also considered to be vital not only in identifying the needs of communities, but in 
their contributions to integrated planning processes.   
This study aims to examine the policy coordination mechanisms of the CRDP, including the 
new lead department tasked with its implementation, since the crosscutting nature of the policy 
problem necessitates such a wide variety of stakeholders coming together and taking a coordinated 
approach. The dissertation will focus on the town of Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape as a case 
study, following a site visit and a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with officials from 
different spheres of government involved in the implementation of the new programme. 
The findings suggest that, despite the benefits of having a new national department, political 
support and financial resources at its disposal, policy coordination in the CRDP is not functioning as it 
should. The line between rural development and agriculture’s mandates are becoming blurred, 
risking duplication between the two departments, while the CRDP’s own chosen mechanism at 
grassroots, the Council of Stakeholders, seems to be duplicating existing Integrated Development 
Planning (IDP) processes at local government level.  The findings also suggest that none of the 
chosen mechanisms proved adequate for resolving or overcoming conflict and other complexities 
hampering coordination at community level. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 | Background  
Rural development has been a part of the South African policy landscape since the country’s 
transition to democracy in 1994. Apartheid policies created extreme inequality in access to all forms 
of opportunity, with the stark contrast between developed urban centres or “well-developed, white-
owned commercial farming areas” and largely rural “Bantustans” or homelands serving as an 
extreme example of the system’s intended outcomes (RSA, 1994:7). As such, rural development 
emerged as a priority in the country’s earliest plans to address these disparities. 
However, these early ambitious, broad strategies aimed at targeting rural development seemed to 
fall by the wayside while the government focused on reducing the budget deficit in the tough 
economic climate of the 1990s. More incremental approaches through interventions like land 
reform and support for smallholder agriculture were favoured instead.  
Nevertheless, following the ANC’s policy conference in Polokwane in 2007, the rural development 
agenda suddenly enjoyed much greater prominence (ANC, 2008:28). A new national Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) was established after the 2009 national elections, 
incorporating the former Department of Land Affairs, but expanding its mandate to include a much 
broader view of rural areas and the interventions needed to stimulate economic activity and 
employment in these areas. Rural development also continued to feature prominently as one of the 
national government’s 5 key priorities, along with education, health, job creation and lowering crime 
rates (Zuma, 2010). 
The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP) was developed as the new department’s 
flagship policy for tackling the issue nationwide. It was framed as a collaborative effort, an exercise 
in policy coordination aimed at bringing government resources to bear on areas where they were 
needed most – the target was simply too great and too complex for a single department to take on 
(Nkwinti in PMG, 2009a).  
In short, the CRDP is considered a strategically important programme for the current ANC 
government, feeding into land reform priorities and attempting to tackle a number of strategic 
objectives simultaneously in order to better the lives of South Africa’s rural population. Policy 
coordination is also a central part of this programme and is considered key to the CRDP’s success. 
This dissertation will therefore aim to contribute to the understanding of policy coordination 
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dynamics in the implementation of the CRDP, while also placing the policy in context by providing an 
overview of past rural development efforts. 
1.2 | Research problem and objectives 
This dissertation will explore the policy coordination mechanisms of the Comprehensive Rural 
Development Programme (CRDP) by studying the programme’s implementation at Riemvasmaak in 
the Northern Cape. Riemvasmaak has a long history of development efforts, since its residents 
lodged one of the country’s first successful land claims in the early 1990s, after being forcibly 
removed from their land by the apartheid government two decades earlier. It was also selected as 
one of the CRDP’s first two pilot sites in 2009, and so remains one of the CRDP’s longest-running 
active sites. 
The research conducted will consider horizontal coordinating efforts across national departments, or 
between sector departments at provincial level.  On the vertical plane, the study will assess the level 
of buy-in from provincial government and local role players, both from municipalities and in the so-
called Council of Stakeholders, which is meant to be representative of beneficiaries and other 
partners in CRDP projects. 
The CRDP is by no means the only attempt at policy coordination in national government, and so it is 
also important to interrogate how the programme’s coordinating structures add to or are 
incorporated in existing attempts at integrated planning between different sector departments, and 
across the three spheres of government. Policy coordination is about promoting efficiency and 
avoiding duplication (Peters, 1998) – it would be contradictory to its own intentions if the CRDP 
duplicated existing development planning mechanisms. 
Even though the outcomes of the CRDP at Riemvasmaak will not be systematically evaluated, 
successful coordination is used as a proxy for successful implementation in this case, since the 
DRDLR framed the CRDP as a policy that would necessarily rely on the coordination of contributions 
from other departments, spheres of government, non-governmental organisations and from 
communities themselves (DRDLR, 2009a: 4).   
The primary research question and sub-questions to be answered in this study are therefore as 
follows:  
• How has the implementation of the CRDP been influenced by its co-ordination mechanisms? 
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o To what extent do the CRDP’s coordination arrangements align with existing 
mechanisms at local government level, such as Integrated Development Planning 
processes? 
o If coordination efforts did break down during the implementation of the CRDP at 
Riemvasmaak, what are the dynamics that contributed to such a breakdown?  
1.3 | Layout of thesis structure 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters, including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the policy context that preceded the development of the 
CRDP. It demonstrates an early emphasis on rural development in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (1994) and continues to explore many enduring themes in rural 
development that are expressed again in the CRDP. This includes the crosscutting nature of rural 
development as a policy problem, the need for a strong lead agency or department to implement 
such a programme, the problematic nature of cooperation between the Land Affairs and Agricultural 
portfolios and some of the complications that arise from the chosen land reform mechanisms up to 
date. 
Chapter 3 offers various insights from the available literature on policy coordination, including past 
attempts at collaboration between the Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture, integrated rural 
development efforts and South Africa’s track record in taking this approach, specifically through the 
implementation of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (2000). 
Chapter 4 outlines the chosen research methodology followed in this thesis, with the emphasis on 
qualitative methods and tools like semi-structured interviews. It also sketches the scope of 
information gathered, and potential limitations of this material. 
Chapter 5 delves into the findings of the practical research conducted for this thesis, exploring 
common themes emerging from interviews with several officials involved in rural development at 
national, provincial and local government level. The information outlined in this chapter is ultimately 
used to answer the stated research question and sub-questions in Chapter 6. 
This dissertation is by no means an exhaustive study of the CRDP, but offers a detailed look at the 
policy coordination mechanisms that form such a key part of the policy’s chances of success.  
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Chapter 2: Policy overview of rural development 
 
2.1 | Introduction 
This chapter aims to give a policy chronology of the initiatives aimed at rural development that 
preceded the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), which was adopted by the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) in 2009. This overview also includes a 
discussion on the relevant legislation, White Papers and other documents that make up the broader 
policy context in which these programmes were introduced. 
2.2 | The Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) 
As the development roadmap for the first democratically elected government of South Africa, the 
RDP emphasised the need to extend basic services to all citizens, often singling out rural 
communities as lagging the furthest behind in access to water, social grants and other forms of 
physical and social infrastructure (RSA, 1994: 27). In fact, an earlier version of the RDP, then still a 
policy framework of the African National Congress, estimated that as many as 11 million of the 17 
million South Africans thought to be living in poverty at the time resided in rural areas (ANC, 1994). 
In an attempt to address these backlogs, the Presidential lead projects outlined under the RDP’s 
rural development agenda focus on rural water provision, land reform pilot programmes, land 
redistribution and restitution, as well as small-scale farmer development (RSA, 1994:43). These 
initial priorities – improved service delivery in rural areas, land reform and support for small-holder 
agriculture – would later be formalised in sector-specific policies as well as rural development 
strategies.  
They also illustrated for the first time the inherent crosscutting nature of rural development, 
involving different national departments such as Water Affairs and Land Affairs, as well as 
departments with competencies divided between national and provincial level, such as Agriculture. 
It also touched on service delivery and infrastructure issues under the purview of local government, 
such as electricity, water and sanitation services. 
Starting with the RDP pilot projects and its characterisation of service delivery backlogs in rural 
areas, rural development is therefore not considered a standalone issue, but a product of combined 
interventions across different policy sectors and spheres of government. The RDP also mentions the 
need to formulate an “integrated”, cross-sectoral rural development policy (Ibid, 41), with the 
Presidency and the Departments of Water Affairs and Land Affairs acting as lead ministries (Ibid, 49). 
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2.3 | The Rural Development Framework (1997) 
While the RDP sketched the first outline of rural development as a policy priority, the Rural 
Development Framework (DLA, 1997) offered a more thorough, focused overview of the 
practicalities of tackling such a crosscutting policy problem. The document was originally drawn up 
by the Rural Development Task team within the RDP office, but was finalised and published under 
the Department of Land Affairs. 
The Rural Development Framework attempts to define a role for the state in shaping and promoting 
rural development, while remaining committed to the fiscal austerity outlined in the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR, 1996) programme. The framework highlights two main areas 
of concern – providing physical infrastructure and access to various social services, as well as 
creating the conditions that allow for economic development, job creation and industry as a means 
of improving the lives of citizens in rural areas. 
In the mid-1990s, it was estimated that as much as 75% of the country’s poor could be found 
residing in rural areas. Among rural citizens, roughly 73% could be classified as poor, compared to a 
poverty rate of 40% in urban areas, and as low as 20% in metropolitan areas (DLA, 1997, quoting an 
RDP office report). 
Rural areas, in this context, are defined as “sparsely populated areas in which people farm or 
depend on natural resources, including the villages and small towns that are dispersed through 
these areas”. The framework also notes that this represents a change from older definitions, which 
focused mainly on sparsely populated areas, but since this would include certain peri-urban 
settlements and hostels accommodating migrant workers, the old definition may have served to 
inflate average rural incomes (DLA, 1997). 
Note that settlement in these “sparsely populated areas” was also greatly influenced if not wholly 
determined by apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act (1950), which specified which race 
groups would be permitted to live in certain areas. Settlement and migration patterns in South 
African rural areas are therefore not just based on economic opportunity, but determined by 
carefully engineered apartheid policy. 
The importance of policy coordination is stressed early on in the framework, including provincial 
development strategies and inter-departmental co-operation at provincial level, with local 
government coordinating at community level, although it is noted that most rural municipalities are 
ill equipped to perform this function. The need to strengthen the capacity of local government in 
rural areas is therefore mentioned repeatedly, whether relating to planning, infrastructure, 
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development or the promotion of economic activities in agriculture, tourism, public works and other 
commercial ventures. 
A wide variety of national departments are also identified as sharing responsibility for different 
aspects of the framework. In reference to rural infrastructure development, the list includes the 
Department of Transport (road infrastructure), the Department of Water Affairs (access to water 
infrastructure), the Department of Housing, the Department of Land Affairs, the Department of 
Constitutional Development, the Department of Minerals and Energy and the Development Bank of 
South Africa. 
As such, the framework predicts that it may be necessary to place the rural development agenda 
within the Presidency, or another “cross-sectoral” department such as Finance, in an attempt to 
ensure effective co-ordination.  
Financial contributions are said to be sourced from all three spheres of government, including rates 
and taxes paid by rural residents themselves, at local government level. This revenue stream has its 
limitations, however, since it relies on rural residents being able to afford these levies. Provincial 
government is expected to contribute through sector-specific programmes in, for instance, health 
and education, while national government will administer grants for infrastructure development. 
The coordination of these funds is flagged as a possible challenge: 
There is, in any case, expected to be a basic tension between the vertical organisation of line 
departments and local government attempts at horizontal coordination. Vertical loyalties are much the 
more powerful, particularly when a local government's coordinating efforts are not buttressed by 
adequate discretionary funding, i.e. taxes, levies and duties as well as other sources, including 
subventions from provincial and national government. Indeed, the scope for local level planning will be 
closely related to the discretionary resources available. (DLA, 1997: Section 6.3 - Issues in local level 
planning) 
Unfortunately, the framework sought mainly to “[describe] the overall policy framework that is 
emerging” (ibid) and had no legal status as official policy or legislation (Bass & Hearne, 2000), making 
it difficult to find any evidence of its implementation. 
In all probability, the complexity and expansive nature of this rural development agenda was too 
great to tackle from within the Department of Land Affairs itself, which had a more singular land 
reform mandate to fulfil. Meanwhile, it would have been very difficult to mount a centrally 
coordinated, cross-cutting strategy after the closure of the RDP office and with limited financial 
resources available while the National Treasury aimed to reduce the budget deficit. 
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As such, rural development had to be addressed more incrementally, through policy interventions in 
agriculture and land affairs. It was only in the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy 
(2000) that the South African government would return to the more ambitious scope of the Rural 
Development Framework’s original vision for rural development.  
2.4 | White Paper on Agriculture (1995) 
The White Paper on Agriculture identifies the sector as “a major factor in rural economic growth and 
development”, while also acknowledging the need for support programmes in “broadening the 
economic and social opportunities of rural and urban people” (DoA, 1995). However, the document 
states, this potential role for agriculture in rural areas will have to be coordinated between 
government departments, including the Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs, non-
governmental organisations and the private sector. 
In order to address inequality in rural areas, the White Paper argues that access to the agricultural 
sector will need to be broadened “via land reform”, “technical and financial assistance” to emerging 
small-scale farmers, as well as improvements to rural infrastructure and service delivery (Ibid). In 
other words, the role of the agricultural sector in rural areas is clearly situated within a broader, 
cross-sectoral approach to rural development.  
Although the interim Constitution of 1993 characterised agriculture as a provincial competency, the 
White Paper acknowledges the sector’s “national character as an integrated sector”, with roles for 
both national and provincial departments. Indeed, the new Constitution (RSA, 1996: 147-8) later 
defined agriculture as a concurrent competency, sharing responsibility between the two spheres. 
This implies a need for coordination both at horizontal level, across sectors, and vertically, between 
the national and provincial spheres. 
Other aspects of the White Paper hint at a dramatic transformation already underway in the 
agricultural sector and the way it would be governed. The once powerful and well-funded national 
Department of Agriculture was restructured to delegate to and share responsibility with new 
provincial departments, with a gradually declining budget allocation. In real terms, the national and 
provincial departments’ allocated funds in the year 2001 represented a mere 45% of those ploughed 
into the corresponding national and homeland departments in 1988 (Vink & Kirsten, 2003:4-6). 
As such, it would seem as if emerging black farmers and new land reform beneficiaries hoping to set 
up productive farms would not enjoy the extensive protection and support afforded to commercial 
white farmers in preceding decades. Despite the smaller financial allocations, however, the White 
Paper on Agriculture became one of the first post-apartheid policy documents to prioritise support 
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for emerging black farmers as a way of developing rural areas – a principle that would later feed into 
initiatives such as the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (2004). 
2.5 | White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 
There are three parts to the proposed land reform programme outlined in this White Paper, roughly 
aligning with the principles of land reform and property ownership outlined in Section 25 of the 
Constitution. These include: 
− Land restitution, returning land or providing compensation for land that was unjustly claimed as a 
result of the racially discriminatory laws and policies of the past. 
− Land redistribution, allowing the poor and disadvantaged to purchase land under the “willing 
buyer/willing seller” model, e.g. through the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant. 
− Land tenure reform, the most complex of the three, according to the White paper, creating a uniform 
and legal “system of landholding”, resolving disputes over tenure rights and supporting those who 
have been displaced (DLA, 1997:7) 
Broadly speaking, land redistribution aims to provide the poor with access to land for purposes of 
both settlement and for production, whether for subsistence purposes or to supplement existing 
incomes (Ibid, 12). By committing to the “willing-seller, willing-buyer” principle, however, the White 
Paper firmly established a market-led land reform process, rather than allowing government to 
become “directly involved” in purchasing land for redistribution. Instead, it provides grants and 
services supporting beneficiaries in purchasing land at a market-related price (ibid, 9). 
Progress in land reform has been very slow. The initial goal of redistributing 30% of commercially 
viable land by 1999 quickly fell by the wayside when only 1% could be transferred by the end of the 
1990s (Hall, 2007:88). This target was later revised to 30% redistribution by 2014, but recently 
released data shows that only 10% (or a third of the initial goal) had been transferred by the end of 
2012, making it highly unlikely that this goal could be reached (DPM&E, 2013a). 
When it comes to what the land is used for after being transferred, the White Paper points to the 
issue of national and provincial competencies, noting that land reform is a national competency, 
while the responsibilities relating to agriculture and rural development are shared between national 
and provincial authorities (RSA, 1996:147-8). As such, “it is the responsibility of provincial 
governments to provide complementary development support to beneficiaries (of land reform)” 
(DLA, 1997:21).  
The success of the land reform programme is not limited to a percentage of land transferred, but 
extends to the impact this asset has on the lives of beneficiaries and their communities. The 
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responsibility for ensuring this success after the initial transfer, however, is shared but largely 
outside of the purview of a national department tasked with administrating land reform (initially the 
Department of Land Affairs, and later the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform). This 
distribution of responsibility therefore necessitates both coordination and “a clear understanding” 
between national and provincial governments to determine which sphere is responsible for different 
aspects of land reform, as well as the subsequent support services provided to beneficiaries of the 
programme (Ibid, 21). 
Rural areas are described as “complex and diverse”, since land in these areas could serve a number 
of different purposes. For example, it could be used to grow crops for food, or to graze livestock, on 
a subsistence scale or as a means of supplementing income from farm work. The need for flexible 
redistribution programmes that are mindful of these different “needs and circumstances” is 
therefore also highlighted (Ibid, 52). It follows that support services would also need to be tailored 
to these very different uses of the transferred land. 
As with the RDP and the White Paper on Agriculture, the White Paper on Land Reform therefore 
highlights the need for both horizontal and vertical coordination. The complexity of these policies in 
practice, and the need for flexibility in application noted above, would likely also provide a test for 
these coordination mechanisms – any adaptations made in one area of these interlinked policies and 
programmes will impact on other policy priorities. 
2.6 | SLAG (1997) and LRAD (2001) grants 
The principles of the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) were first outlined in the White 
Paper on South African Land Policy (DLA, 1997). The grant paid out a maximum of R15 000 per 
individual or a group of beneficiaries, provided the majority was estimated to be living in rural areas 
(Ibid, 67), as a means of supporting those hoping to purchase land. The possibility of assistance for 
poor, rural local governments in acquiring land for use as municipal commonages, broadening access 
to land in the process, was also raised in the White Paper (DLA, 1997: 73). 
The SLA grant remained the main mechanism available to poor South Africans hoping to access 
redistributed land until 2001, but the system produced a number of complications as it was being 
implemented.  
As a result of the grants’ relatively small size, for instance, large groups of beneficiaries often had to 
pool their resources in order to purchase a sizeable commercial farm. These groups would then have 
to accommodate a variety of interests, from beneficiaries who wish to continue farming on the land, 
to those who saw the land purely as an asset to be managed. The grants were also targeted at poor 
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individuals and households, excluding emerging farmers earning more than the cut-off amount of 
R1500 per month. This meant that beneficiaries also lacked the capital to continue investing in their 
new farms, while the Department of Agriculture provided very little support to make up for these 
deficits (Van den Brink, Thomas & Binswanger, 2007:175; Hall, 2009:26). 
The new Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD, 2001) grant, then, hoped to target 
emerging farmers in higher income brackets, making more money available (R20 000 to R100 000), 
but requiring beneficiaries to put up a certain amount of capital in order to qualify for this grant 
(DALA, 2001:1). The funds could be used to cover land acquisition, infrastructure, capital assets and 
other agricultural inputs, depending on the needs of beneficiaries (Ibid, 4). 
By doing so, the LRAD hoped to improve access to land for black South Africans, help improve 
nutrition and work opportunities for those living in rural areas and stimulate growth in the 
agricultural sector, all the while speeding along the process of redistributing 30% of the country’s 
agricultural land1
To this end, the LRAD shifted project approval processes from the national Minister of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs to provincial departments, which Van den Brink, Thomas & Binswanger (2007:176) 
points to as the  “main factor explaining...faster delivery” in the roll out of the LRAD. These 
provincial departments also became more involved in post-settlement support, although all 
provinces didn’t perform their duties equally well (Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall, 2003:26). 
. The grant was envisioned to contribute to land reform and rural development as 
well as supporting emerging black farmers. The basic principles of the programme also included 
greater flexibility and decentralisation of decision-making (Ibid, 3). 
Despite success in “faster delivery”, however, Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall (2003:26) note that evidence 
suggests the LRAD did not manage “to overcome the problems associated with SLAG”. The often 
unwieldy large group projects described above persisted under the new programme, at least partly 
because of high land prices (Ibid, and Hall, 2009:26). 
2.7 | The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS, 
2000)  
The main purpose of the ISRDS is carefully spelled out in its name – focusing on integrating 
existing programmes, ensuring better co-ordination between the three spheres of governments and 
different line departments tasked with rural development, and building on these programmes from 
                                                             
1 The LRAD also deals with improving access to municipal and tribal land (commonages) for grazing animals, 
although the financial mechanisms for such transfers are not outlined in the DALA (2001) document quoted 
here. 
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the bottom up, with communities actively participating in the process. Securing community 
participation in selecting projects and programmes, and sharing responsibility with these 
communities, are seen as key to creating sustainable projects. 
The strategy, later dubbed a programme in its own right, was developed at the start of a second 
term of office for the ruling African National Congress (ANC), born from a renewed vigour to address 
rural poverty, but also to improve policy coordination among the different spheres of government 
(Everatt, 2004:2-3). The mechanism that would join all these different strands together was the 
newly established Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) legally required at local government level 
(Ibid, 3). 
The ISRDP was envisioned to roll out to selected “nodes”, or spatially defined areas. “The concept of 
nodal development is based on spatial targeting,” the policy explains, “where resources are directed 
to selected areas in response to identified development problems and opportunities (The 
Presidency, 2000b: paragraph 97). Using targeting criteria from national departments such as Public 
Works, Water Affairs and Forestry, Environment and Tourism, as well as provincial rural 
development plans and their focus areas, the potential “problems and opportunities” in specific 
nodes can be identified and addressed. 
Spatial targeting by its very nature, therefore, implies both horizontal and vertical coordination is 
required in the implementation of the ISRDS in particular nodes. In choosing this strategy, the ISRDS 
also seems to acknowledge the limitations of a national, crosscutting strategy like the Rural 
Development Framework when it comes to identifying and addressing needs at local level. Instead of 
attempting to find a one-size-fits-all strategy with buy-in from across various departments and 
spheres of government, the ISRDS breaks the problem down to smaller geographically delimited 
areas. Even though it remains an overarching, crosscutting strategy, it doesn’t have to secure 
cooperation from the outset, across both vertical and horizontal planes, but more incrementally, as 
it relates to needs at particular nodes. 
District municipalities are the preferred spatial targets of the programme, but the possibility of 
focusing more closely on sub-districts within them, or beyond the boundaries of a particular district, 
is not ruled out. This flexibility is deemed necessary because the economic linkages that would form 
part of proposed development strategies (e.g. family members working in an urban centre, sending 
money home to those living in rural districts) could take on various forms (The Presidency, 2000b: 
paragraph 98). 
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As mentioned above, Everatt (2004:5) quotes the Rural Development Framework of 1997 as 
suggesting the Presidency or another crosscutting department such as Finance be tasked with 
coordinating such a strategy, with Finance clearly having the additional benefit of being able to 
oversee expenditure on rural development. In the absence of a national department in charge of 
rural development, the original ISRDS assigned the Deputy President to drive the strategy nationally, 
although this function was later shifted to the relatively new Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (Mbeki, 2001).  
Given the key role that local government was envisioned to play in the implementation of the ISRDP 
and development generally, this decision is not surprising. Even before the ISRDP, the Local 
Government White Paper of 1998 outlined the role of local government in ensuring integrated 
development in both urban and rural areas (Dept of Provincial Affairs & Constitutional Development, 
1998). However, it is worth mentioning that the DPLG was never involved in the initial formulation 
or planning process for the programme (Everatt, 2004:11). The DPLG had to coordinate with several 
other departments at national level, but arguably lacked the authority that the Presidency or the 
Department of Finance could have wielded to ensure cooperation in all spheres and at all levels of 
government. 
Despite this limitation, the ISRDP seemed to enjoy considerable political support at the time of its 
development, with the Department of Minerals and Energy and other sectoral departments with a 
presence or stake in rural areas participating in the process (Everatt, 2004:8-9) 
Each selected “node” or municipal district where the ISRDS is implemented was also allocated its 
own nodal champion (potentially a Minister, a Premier, an MEC or a local mayor). Nodal champions 
were tasked with providing political leadership, and required to sign performance agreements and 
report to national government on the progress made. Unfortunately, none of the reports by the 
DPLG (2008), PSC (2009) and the Independent Development Trust (Everatt, 2004) make any specific 
mention of these agreements, nor do they stipulate whether they were drawn up, signed or adhered 
to.  
Each nodal champion was also tasked with leading a project team, drawing its membership from 
national, provincial and local government, local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) as well as the private sector, all led by a delivery manager, 
who reports to the nodal champion (The Presidency, 2000a: 30,36,38). These teams would then 
work with and report to Integrated Development Plan (IDP) structures at local government level 
(Ibid, viii). 
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In the South African context, the ISRDS notes that government spending during the first 5 years of 
democratic rule still showed an urban bias in development planning  (ibid, 9). Nevertheless, some 
progress had been made, notably in access to water and electricity infrastructure for individuals and 
schools, in telecommunications services and in community-based public works programmes 
providing some work opportunities in these areas (Ibid, 13). 
Despite these achievements, development programs were “beset by problems of coordination and 
communication with frequent complaints that sub-projects do not reflect community priorities and 
are not well maintained (Ibid, 15).” From The Presidency’s perspective, this was because the same 
line departments that funded these projects also implemented them, while local councils lacked a 
strong enough mandate to coordinate the relevant priorities and funding, and to align them to local 
needs. The “major lesson learned” from the first 6 years of democracy, according to the ISRDS, was 
the “need for integration and co-ordination” at local level (ibid, 16) – a function it hoped to 
strengthen through new local government structures and through the emphasis placed on 
Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) drawn up at this level. 
In practise, the ISRDS faced very similar challenges to previous programmes, despite outlining 
potential obstacles so clearly from the outset. A report by the Public Service Commission (2009), 
specifically investigating integration and coordination in the programme’s implementation, struggled 
to identify the value added by the “new” strategy.  
The ISRDS aimed to use “existing institutional, planning, management...mechanisms” (PSC, 2009:16), 
namely the Integrated Development Plans drawn up by municipalities, and existing funding from 
municipal budgets, funds allocated by line departments via the IDP process, “commitments from 
donor organisations and NGOs” and public-private partnerships (The Presidency, 2000b: x). The 
complications associated with this approach are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Even though the ISRDS itself did not add new institutional arrangements or funding to the mix, 
however, it should be noted that it was using an entirely new local government structure and 
approach to planning as a key mechanism to facilitate change, as well as a new national department 
(the DPLG) to coordinate these efforts. Perhaps it was overly optimistic to expect the newly 
established structures to produce a different outcome so soon after implementation.  
The concept of developmental local government or development driven by local agendas may have 
enjoyed some political support, but local authorities still struggled to assert themselves in practice. 
Without financial or other means of asserting their authority or driving their own agendas, it seems 
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as if local governments still struggled to make themselves heard under the ISRDS. See section 3.4 for 
more complete overview of the literature on the ISRDS and its implementation record. 
2.8 | Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP, 2004) 
During the first 10 years of land reform implementation, support for beneficiaries hoping to use 
transferred land productively seemed to be lacking, with the emphasis initially placed simply on the 
amount of land redistributed. In fact, there seemed to be a general disconnect between the land 
affairs and agriculture portfolios, despite the fact that these departments were combined under a 
single ministry at the time (Hall, 2007:100). However, the early 2000s brought with it a renewed 
focus on what happens after land is handed over to beneficiaries, including whether they could 
extract any benefit from the land in a sustainable way.  
Firstly, this translated into the move from the SLAG to LRAD as a means of funding land reform 
projects, with the clear intention of co-ordinating and integrating the Departments of Land Reform 
and Agriculture’s efforts to establish sustainable farming activity on redistributed land (Cousins, 
2013:51). LRAD targeted beneficiaries who were able to invest in projects themselves, with the hope 
that they would also be able to help sustain these projects successfully in the long term (DALA, 
2001:1-4). CASP followed in a similar vein, since it was the first attempt at funding post-settlement 
support directly, in order to improve land reform projects’ chances of success.  
Still, the mechanisms chosen to do this proved to be more complex and fraught than initially 
envisioned. Naidoo (2009: 268) explains that provincial departments were tasked with implementing 
CASP as a support programme for emerging (black) farmers. Funding was allocated through 
supplementary conditional grants, separate from provincial departments’ core budgets, to be 
directed specifically towards CASP projects. Conditional grants also came with stipulations about the 
way these funds should be spent – in this case, at least 70% of the funds had to be spent on land 
reform beneficiaries, rather than emerging small-holder farmers in general.  
Support services were expected to take a variety of forms, from technical advice to setting up 
physical infrastructure on the farms, but once again the national department provided conditions to 
the allocation of funds. Physical infrastructure would receive special priority status in the first year of 
implementation, and remained a priority even after the formal stipulation lapsed (ibid, 272). 
In reality, however, these conditions were a simplistic template for very complex real-life situations 
faced at provincial level. Just as beneficiaries of the R15 000 SLA grants had pooled resources in 
order to purchase larger properties, beneficiaries under the LRAD grants pooled their contributions 
(whether in cash or labour provided) to access the more substantial amounts of funding needed to 
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purchase large tracts of commercially viable land. Within these groups, however, individuals often 
had different expectations and plans for the land, making it necessary for support officials from 
provincial agriculture departments to step in and mediate to resolve conflicts and formulate a 
coherent strategy for the farming operations (Ibid, 269).  
While the initial prioritisation of infrastructure was meant to expire after a year, the emphasis 
remained in place for several more years in some provinces’ spending patterns. Even the expanded 
basket of support services, including technical and financial support and training, proved limited in 
practice. Provincial officials may have been officially authorised to provide different kinds of support, 
but the emphasis on previously underserviced land reform beneficiaries meant that constructing 
certain farm infrastructure was often the most basic and pressing need on these projects. At the 
same time, the funds available for other services such as training and marketing, were limited under 
the national Department of Agriculture’s Business Plan Framework for CASP (Naidoo, 2009:271).  
Provincial officials on the ground had to deal with complex group dynamics and a variety of support 
needs amongst groups of land reform beneficiaries. With the above stipulations and restrictions in 
place, they didn’t have the necessary room to manoeuvre and adapt the sequencing and 
prioritisation of support services to their particular conditions (Ibid, 271-3). In other words, the 
conditions set at national level did not speak to the needs at provincial level. The apparent absence 
of coordination and feedback mechanisms between the two spheres also didn’t allow for the 
necessary adjustments to be made. One official described it as such (Naidoo, 2009:272): 
I think, what we experience, as I said earlier on, we as a national department have a particular 
objective with CASP...it could have been that if you looked at these different pillars that a particular 
provinces says, look...our infrastructure, on farm/off farm is fine, we are dealing with [problems with] 
financing, we are dealing with production grants...so here we come and we give them supplementary 
money for infrastructure...it could then be that we are imposing upon them something which is either 
an opportunity for them, or not an opportunity but some sort of imposition. 
Beyond these complications on the vertical plane, horizontal coordination between the Departments 
of Land Affairs and Agriculture also produced problems. By focusing primarily on post-settlement 
support services for the beneficiaries of land reform, CASP necessitated cooperation between these 
two sectors (Naidoo, 2008: 96-97). However, officials from provincial agriculture departments were 
concerned that this focus on new and often inexperienced entrants into agriculture would not make 
for sustainable production. Potentially deserving emerging farmers who had not benefitted from 
land reform programmes would likely be excluded, they argued, even if they were more likely to 
achieve sustainable production with the support provided (Ibid, 99-101).  
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Even if they could accept this as a necessary focus of policy, the relationship between the 
Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs proved complicated in practice. A difference in 
timeframes for the allocation of funding in either department meant that CASP monies could often 
only be made available several months or even a year after beneficiaries received their land 
allocations through the LRAD programme – a substantial blow to new farmers with limited 
resources, needing support to ensure productive use of the land (Ibid, 110-111).  
There also seemed to be some overlaps between CASP and the LRAD grant process, which allowed 
for the funding of, among several other aspects of land reform projects, “infrastructure investments” 
(Ibid, 112). What the difference between this type of planning support and funding allocated under 
LRAD and similar support services under CASP would be, was unclear. 
Coupled with this confusion between departments was further confusion on the ground, where 
potential beneficiaries of land reform were often not informed of the services available under CASP 
as part of information sessions around LRAD and other land reform processes (Ibid, 113). Clearly 
there were some difficulties in horizontal coordination relating to both synchronisation of funding 
cycles and information sharing, between departments and with beneficiaries. 
The coordination of CASP, in other words, proved to be fraught on both the vertical and horizontal 
planes, especially when it came to coordinating the timing of land handovers and support services, 
as well as the distribution of information amongst potential beneficiaries. 
2.9 | Post-Polokwane policymaking: A new era for rural development? 
The ruling African National Congress’ policy conference, held in Polokwane in 2007, brought with it a 
renewed focus on South Africa’s development trajectory. Just as continued high levels of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment inspired new approaches to development in the broader sense, these 
factors and the slow progress in land reform reinvigorated discussions on rural development. 
“Land reform,” the conference resolutions read, “has not been located within a broader strategy of 
rural development or a commitment to supporting smallholder farming on a scale that is able to 
improve rural livelihoods (ANC, 2008:27).” As a result, the resolutions state, policies up to date had 
not improved the lives of rural residents in the way intended. Not only was the transfer of land to 
beneficiaries proceeding slowly, but the intended positive impact on rural communities was also 
absent. 
The resolutions reposition rural development as a “central pillar of the fight against poverty, 
unemployment and inequality”, while also pointing to the need for the integration of rural 
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development, land reform and change in the agricultural sector within a cohesive and clear strategy 
(Ibid, 29). Viewing this in the context of the earlier policies surveyed in this section, the need for an 
integrated approach is not necessarily a new proposition, but it does point to the apparent failure of 
past, more incremental initiatives aimed at co-ordinating rural development. 
Beyond the intention to embark on this integrated programme, the resolutions also detail the need 
for “stronger state capacity” and new institutional arrangements for driving the new programme. 
This includes the creation of an “over-arching authority with the resources and authority to drive 
and co-ordinate an integrated programme” (presumably the intention behind the national 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, established in 2009), building the capacity of 
local government, ensuring that both government and the private sector provide the necessary 
support services and reviewing the existing policies and legislation relating to these sectors (Ibid, 
31).  
Finally, and crucially for this study of coordination in the Comprehensive Rural Development 
Programme, the resolutions note the need to “improve the co-ordination and synergy between 
departments and all levels of government to ensure an integrated approach to land reform and rural 
development (Ibid, 35).” Policy coordination is therefore once again highlighted as a crucial part of 
the ruling party’s approach to rural development. 
The renewed emphasis on rural development is not restricted to ANC policy documents and the new 
DRDLR, but is also included in the overarching National Development Plan (NPC, 2011) produced by 
the National Planning Commission in the Presidency. The NDP’s references to rural development 
reaffirms the cross-sectoral approach described above, from the need to raise agricultural output 
(NPC, 2011: 128) to improving service delivery in areas such as water provision (Ibid, 181), health 
care and basic education (Ibid, 234). The role of the new DRDLR is also acknowledged in relation to 
spatial planning, along with the need for improved capacity for strategic planning and development 
at local government level (Ibid, 290).  
2.10 | Summary 
The national vision for rural development, including land reform, smallholder agriculture and service 
delivery, has not changed dramatically over the first 20 years of democratic rule. The need for 
flexibility and capacity to deal with complexity at grassroots level has necessitated a decentralised 
approach, which in turn requires a high level of coordination – land reform remains a national 
competency, agriculture is supported primarily at provincial level and local government is tasked 
with service delivery and coordinating development in response to communities’ needs.  
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The new national Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, along with its flagship 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), therefore, are the latest in a series of 
interventions hoping to ensure greater coherence in the way rural development is tackled. It is clear 
from the policy review above that any lead agency on this issue will need to find a way reconcile 
different policy priorities within departments, misaligned budgeting and planning cycles, while also 
remaining responsive to the often complex dynamics at grassroots level.  
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Chapter 3: Literature review 
3.1 | Introduction 
This literature review aims to provide an overview of theoretical perspectives on policy coordination, 
as well as South Africa’s efforts at coordinating rural development policies in practice. Since the 
previous chapter has demonstrated the close link between the land reform and agricultural policies 
of national government departments and the rural development agenda, this chapter necessarily 
also considers coordination efforts in these sectors.  
The discussion will deal specifically with the impact of competing policy priorities at the already 
complex grassroots of land reform projects, factors that contribute to the fraught coordination 
efforts between the departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture thus far, integrated rural 
development and South Africa’s track record in implementing this approach.  
3.2 | Policy coordination and implementation 
The study of policy coordination has long been a feature of the field of implementation analysis 
(Hood, 2005). Perri 6 (2004:106) defines policy coordination as the “development of ideas about 
joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of 
planning and making decisions”. It can be considered as a process, as illustrated in the definition 
above, or as an ideal “end-state” in which policy programmes not only address all problems as 
intended, but function coherently and avoid duplicating existing programmes in doing so (Peters, 
1998:296). 
Pollitt (2003:35) lists four underlying motives for the drive towards coordination, which point 
primarily towards efficiency – eliminating contradictions between different policies and agendas, 
making better use of resources, improving the flow of ideas and producing better integrated, 
‘seamless’ services to citizens. 
Still, there is a rationale for departments sometimes working as separate entities. In fact, this often 
allows them to specialise and accumulate expertise in certain areas and with particular goals in mind 
(Hood 2005:22). It does become problematic, however, if departments start operating with “tunnel 
vision...and (a) preoccupation with defending institutional turf in what were commonly termed 
‘vertical silos’ ” (Hood, 2005:22). 
This “tunnel vision” is exactly what Public Choice theorists predict to be ‘rational’ human behaviour, 
with bureaucrats acting as “self-interested utility maximisers” – they are focused on getting the 
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maximum benefit (e.g. access to budgets or staff) for themselves, and minimising their own risk of 
failure, since poor performance might jeopardise their access to these resources. That is their chief 
concern, rather than the more altruistic goal of achieving effective service delivery (Kavanagh & 
Richards, 2001:2). 
From this perspective, collaboration or coordination with other departments may well be considered 
a threat, since it may serve to divert a department’s effort and funds away from its own key 
priorities (Kavanagh & Richards, 2001:1-2). This makes it especially difficult to tackle policy problems 
that cut across departmental boundaries. These so-called “wicked issues”, such as poverty or 
homelessness, are so complex and involve so many different factors and sectors of government that 
no one department could realistically find a solution on its own – interdepartmental collaboration is 
considered key in these cases (Ibid, 8). 
Perspectives on how best to promote coordination are varied. Peters (1998:298), for instance, 
describes one conceptualisation of co-ordination in government as a “top-down hierarchy 
dependent upon central agencies” which functions well, provided that the organisations involved 
“have a clear mandate about what to do”. At the same time, however, a hierarchy that exists in 
name only (not in terms of influence or power) may very well fail to encourage coordination (Ibid, 
299). 
O’Toole and Montjoy (1984:492) point to another approach, where coordination is voluntary and 
the motivations and incentives at play determine whether coordination can work. Role players can 
choose to collaborate in order to assert some form of authority, to pursue a common interest in 
achieving the goals of a particular programme or to secure some form of exchange (e.g. cooperation 
in exchange for a particular benefit, such as funding). Peters (1998:299) refers to this alternative as 
the network perspective, involving a fair degree of “negotiation and mediation” compared to the 
“top-down” hierarchical approach described above. 
In the South African context, rural development has clearly been conceptualised as a crosscutting or 
“wicked” issue from the early days of democracy. It would also seem that policy coordination was 
considered necessary for finding solutions to rural poverty and service delivery issues, whether it 
was through an overarching authority like the former RDP ministry, or through horizontal 
collaboration between the departments of agriculture and land reform. 
Horizontal coordination is a common objective in South African policymaking, from the RDP through 
to the National Development Plan (NPC, 2011), with goals involving several different departments 
often formulated at national level. Vertical coordination is also entrenched in the legislative 
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framework provided by the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996). More specifically, Chapter 3 of 
the Constitution provides the guidelines for co-operative governance, which dictates that the various 
spheres of government should “co-operate with each other in mutual trust and good faith”. This 
includes sharing information and consulting on “matters of common interest”, as well as co-
ordination of policies and legislation produced to ensure effective and coherent governance (RSA, 
1996:25-26).  
The Constitution therefore provides not only the mandates for various spheres of government 
relating to rural development, but the terms of engagement and collaboration across these spheres 
and national departments as well. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act no. 13, 
2005:12) builds on this chapter to provide a framework for coordination and policy implementation, 
with the aim of promoting coherent and effective service delivery, monitoring and evaluation of 
implementation and, ultimately, the achievement of policy goals with the combined efforts of 
national, provincial and local governments. 
Additional foundations for coordinated development and financial planning are also laid by the 
White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Public Finance Management Act (1999) and the 
Municipal Systems Act (2000).  
Both the RDP and NDP were established with dedicated institutional capacity at national level, with 
the RDP administrated by its own ministry and the NDP developed by a National Planning 
Commission from within The Presidency, although arguably neither has succeeded in enforcing their 
authority and ensuring coordination in real terms.  Kraak (2011:351) specifically traces the collapse 
of the RDP Office, which laboured under an additional challenge – the RDP fund was financed by line 
departments giving up some of their allocated budget. Not only did individual departments resent 
having to give up funds, but the arrangement also meant that departments had to secure approval 
and funding from a body they had effectively funded themselves (Ibid and Blumenfeld, 1997:75). 
Following the dissolution of official RDP structures, there were no remaining institutional 
arrangements aimed specifically at addressing key cross-cutting policy issues listed in the RDP, 
including unemployment, poverty and inequality (Kraak, 2011:351-2). It was only later, during 
President Thabo Mbeki’s second term in office, that coordination resurfaced as a national priority, 
with concrete planning and monitoring functions situated within the Presidency (Ibid, 352-3). 
The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS, 2000) seemed to represent a return 
to this crosscutting approach to rural development. Using Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) 
drawn up at local government level as a key coordinating mechanism, it also contained a strong 
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vertical coordination component between the three spheres of government, over and above the 
horizontal coordination required at national and provincial level. 
Despite this resurgence of coordination as a policy priority, however, the establishment of the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform in 2009 may be viewed as an indication that 
rural affairs had not been steered effectively at a national level up to that point. In fact, the move 
seems to imply that both the Department of Provincial and Local Government (put in charge of the 
ISRDS) and the Presidency (responsible for coordination at the national level), failed to provide 
proper guidance on these matters during the first 15 years of democratic rule. 
It would seem that there is widespread consensus that rural development objectives can only be 
achieved through coordinated effort by a variety of different departments on the horizontal plane, 
as well as different spheres of government on the vertical plane. Even where there is buy-in for 
coordination, however, different priorities and timelines of the various departments may present 
obstacles to its achievement (Moseley, 2009:22-23). As such, she argues, “establishing coordination 
mechanisms is not in itself a solution to cross-cutting public policy problems. Such mechanisms 
require continual management and nurturing” (Ibid, 23). 
This project therefore aims not only to use the concept of policy coordination to study the 
coordination mechanisms chosen by the CRDP, but also to analyse and understand the driving forces 
and underlying incentives at play, which may either hinder or facilitate coordination. 
3.3 | Coordinating land reform and agriculture  
It is no secret that the key policies of the land reform and agricultural sectors have been poorly 
coordinated to date. In fact, Cousins (2013:47) goes as far as characterising this as the downfall of 
rural development policy thus far: 
 The...fundamental flaw in post-apartheid rural reform policies has been the failure to couple land and 
agricultural reform in a coherent and effective manner…the state has thus attempted to implement 
land reform without engaging in meaningful agrarian reform, thus severely constraining its impact on 
rural poverty and inequality. 
This section focuses on policies and programmes in both sectors, but they are grouped together here 
precisely because their goals, policy content and ultimate outcomes are often inextricable.  
Land reform was first formally outlined as a policy priority and a potential key driver of rural 
development in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RSA, 1994: 43). In the following 
year, the White Paper on Agriculture (DoA, 1995) also acknowledged land reform as a way of 
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broadening access to the agricultural sector, with the main tenets of the policy finally outlined in the 
Constitution (RSA, 1996) and the White Paper on South African Land Policy of 1997 (DLA, 1997:7). 
As outlined in the previous chapter, land reform policy has three main objectives – restitution, 
redistribution and tenure reform. Although each of these has a potential contribution to make in the 
context of rural development, it is redistribution that has often received the most attention. 
Progress in this area has been especially slow, with only 10% of commercially viable land being 
redistributed between the years 1994 and 2012 (DPM&E, 2013a), a mere third of government’s 
stated goal of 30%. 
Before any one of these programmes can contribute positively to rural reform, however, there are 
different steps to the process, each adding a fair degree of complexity that not only complicates 
implementation but also makes the achievement of any progress seem unlikely.  
3.3.1 | Conflicting mandates and policy priorities  
Drimie (2003: 39-34) outlines the situation in the Impendle district in KwaZulu-Natal as an example 
of the true complexities of land reform at grassroots level. The case study suggests that competing 
policy priorities and conflicting mandates within coordinating structures may scupper plans for 
cooperation before the overarching goals of rural development even come into play. 
In the case of Impendle, the national government had a stretch of roughly 22 000 hectares of land 
available for redistribution – a property that was initially intended to form a part of the “homeland” 
of KwaZulu, but could now be repurposed to serve the interests of local communities. Once the state 
declared its intentions, however, the diversity of potential beneficiaries stepping forward to justify 
their claims to the land meant that the transfer of the property was delayed for a full six years. 
The various competing claims included: 
− two separate claims by the amaQadi and the Bhidla dating back to the respective groups being 
dispossessed of their land during colonial times (i.e. land reform based on principle of restitution) 
− a claim by the traditional leadership of the area, who saw this as a chance to relieve the pressure on 
overcrowded tribal lands in the area and to secure their authority as leaders who hold the keys to 
land rights 
− former farm labourers who had worked on the land, who had split into different bargaining groups 
with different demands and were hoping to secure tenure rights 
− plans to settle emerging black farmers on the land (i.e. based on the principle of redistribution) 
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The Department of Agriculture (DoA) had originally been in charge of allocating the land in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, and had started making plans to settle black farmers on the fertile farmland, 
serving its own mandate of diversifying ownership in the commercial agriculture sector (Drimie, 
2003: 44,53). When the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) took over after 1994, however, its concern 
was mainly to secure restitution for those who had been dispossessed of their land and to provide 
alternative sources of livelihoods for the rural poor (Ibid, 44). 
With land allocation and post-settlement support being central to the land reform process, the two 
departments were expected to work together and coordinate their activities, but these different 
policy priorities necessarily aligned them with different claims. The DoA still favoured the farmers 
who had been identified for possible settlement on the land prior to 1994, despite the fact that they 
would have been brought in from outside of the Impendle area. Although the DoA blamed the 
AmaQadi claim for thwarting these plans in the mid-1990s, Drimie writes that the top-down 
imposition of their policy objective (settling emerging black farmers) was simply “unworkable” – in 
truth, it had to be balanced with the need for consultation with broader interests in the area (Ibid, 
54). 
Meanwhile, the DLA favoured the settlement of former labourers and tenants on the land, as well as 
the interests of the AmaQadi. The department also wanted to see the establishment of Community 
Property Associations (CPAs) in order to represent local interests, a type of institution that 
traditional leaders saw as a threat to their authority over land administration in the area (Ibid, 55). 
Land reform policy provided little guidance for prioritising the competing land claims in this instance, 
as they were all based the principles of reform outlined in the Constitution. Add to this the 
realisation of the DLA that it did not have the necessary staff or other forms of capacity to deal with 
and mediate these competing claims effectively, and it seems clear how “well-intentioned” policies 
would have “unravelled” in the face of the true complexities of implementation at local level 
(Drimie, 2003:59, 61). Competing objectives, without clear overarching goals and policy priorities, 
make it very difficult for authorities to coordinate their activities effectively, even more so in the 
face of these complexities in practice. 
Ntshona et al’s (2010) analysis of the land reform claim settled at Dwesa-Cwebe in the Eastern Cape 
offers another interesting example of competing policy objectives within coordinating structures. 
The local community of Dwesa-Cwebe had initially been excluded from accessing land and its 
associated natural resources (e.g. water, grazing etc.) in the name of conservation, but successfully 
pursued a claim in the area in the late 1990s (2010: 356-7).  
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The communities of the region formed the Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust as a legal entity to hold land 
rights, with funds awarded to the trust to be invested in projects that “yield benefits for all members 
of the community” (Ibid, 357). The land was maintained as a reserve, with the administration of the 
natural resources of the area co-managed by a committee of representatives from the trust, the 
Department of Water Affairs, the Eastern Cape provincial conservation authority, the Department of 
Land Affairs and the local municipality (Ibid, 357). Unlike Impendle, where the coordination issue 
was primarily on the horizontal plane (between the Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture), 
this Co-management Committee (CMC) therefore had to coordinate objectives across both the 
horizontal and vertical planes.  
But different representatives serving on this CMC were there to pursue competing interests – the 
conservation authority (Eastern Cape Parks) was still pushing for outright bans on access to natural 
resources, while community members assumed that they would be granted at least some access. 
Eastern Cape Parks also enjoyed considerable power and influence within the CMC. Ntshona et al 
(2010:359) argue that it was almost too intimidating for the community to try and assert their rights 
in a forum of “educated professionals”, civil servants who were there representing their 
departments’ interests. Many community members feared that they would simply be excluded from 
the committee if they attempted to do so (Ibid, 359). 
At the same time, conflict erupted among community representatives themselves, with smaller CPAs 
from each village facing opposition from traditional leaders, for the same reasons put forward by 
Drimie in the case of Impendle. There was no overarching strategy or a set of principles guiding 
coordination, so competing objectives and conflict made successful coordination increasingly 
unlikely. In practice, this simply meant coordination or co-management of the settlement agreement 
was skewed towards the most powerful players (Ibid, 358). 
“The failure of these institutions,” Ntshona et al (2010:359-360) argue, “indicates a need to 
strengthen or clarify them before or at the same time as rights are awarded to people.” As such, the 
authors recommend that a post-settlement strategy form part of all successful claims, clearly setting 
out priorities and ensuring that the local community benefits as intended (Ibid, 360). This suggests 
that the broader goals set out by land reform and rural development strategies were not enough to 
resolve these conflicts, or to strengthen coordination processes at project level. 
3.4 | Integrated rural development in South Africa 
When considering the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, it is not just rural 
development, but integrated rural development that is relevant as a theoretical foundation for the 
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programme. Ruttan (1984:394) notes that the integrated rural development approach drew on at 
least three different intellectual perspectives on the rise in the early 1970s, the first of which seems 
to be a necessary outcome of the type of comprehensive definition of rural development chosen 
earlier in this chapter. 
That is to say, if one accepts that economic growth produces some benefits, but will not necessarily 
result in material benefits, better opportunities or social mobility for all rural citizens, a growth 
promotion strategy must necessarily be combined with other interventions aimed at improving the 
lives of people living in rural areas (Ruttan, 1984:394). Integrated rural development therefore also 
emphasises the need for a broadened economic base in rural areas, improving living conditions and 
basic services such as housing, access to water and road infrastructure, making better use of human 
resources and establishing closer links between the agricultural and other sectors in rural areas 
(Leupolt, 1977: 8-9). 
Secondly, Ruttan (1984:394) credits the rise of ‘systems thinking’ as an important influence. Since 
rural development necessarily involves a combination of interrelated interventions from different 
sectors and spheres of government, it seemed that the integration of these efforts would necessarily 
lead to improved outcomes, whether in agricultural production or more broadly in quality of life for 
rural residents.  
Finally, he points to a sense of disappointment in former technocratic approaches to development, 
which seemed to serve only as a way of controlling rural areas (Ruttan, 1984:394). In contrast, 
integrated rural development identifies a need for “administrative decentralisation” when 
embracing the complexity of regional development, since a strategy co-ordinated strictly from the 
centre may fail to take into account the unique conditions in each region (Leupolt, 1977:9). At the 
same time, greater participation of rural citizens in decision making processes is required to ensure 
that interventions address the real and most urgent needs of rural communities (Ibid, 14). 
Cohen (1980) is very critical of integrated rural development, mostly because of what he considers 
to be a lack of theoretical rigorousness in the field, including continuing disagreement about the 
concept’s definition. He also points out that by specifically choosing and promoting a multipronged 
approach, integrated rural development initiatives may simply overreach themselves and end up 
achieving nothing (Ibid, 197-8). He quotes Ruttan’s (1974) earlier reference to integrated rural 
development as “an ideology in search of a methodology or technology” – although it might be clear 
on the reasons why a multifaceted approach is needed, it is less clear on how such an approach is 
successfully implemented in practice.  
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Cohen (1980:201) therefore sets out to synthesise the features of integrated rural development 
from existing policies and projects. Integrated rural development programmes, he writes, tend to 
focus on promoting agricultural development and food production with an emphasis on small-scale 
producers, along with simultaneously improving rural residents’ quality of life and enhancing 
employment and other opportunities outside of agriculture.  
Furthermore, he finds that IRD efforts are identified by their attempts “to promote comprehensive 
coordination among a wide range of government, parastatal or private sector actors” (Ibid). Policy 
coordination, in other words, forms a key part of most IRD programmes. As a result, however, they 
almost always face problems trying to integrate “fragmented but complementary resources and 
services” across government and private institutional arrangements, with scarce managerial 
resources at their disposal, and inevitably expensive resources (ibid, 202). 
He goes on to identify some broad, somewhat divergent classifications of integrated rural 
development from the existing literature – as a combination of specific development objectives (e.g. 
Leupolt’s combination of growth and equity goals), as bringing together different components that 
support and reinforce the same intended outcome (e.g. different interventions aimed at increased 
agricultural productivity), as identifiable by specific project characteristics or simply by its emphasis 
on spatial planning (Cohen, 1980:202-207).  
This lack of conceptual clarity, he admits, is probably a result of integrated rural development being 
more of an “operational rather than a theoretical concept”, but he cautions against accepting this 
status quo. A lack of clarity may, after all, make it difficult to identify the problems that stand in the 
way of progress or tangible positive outcomes for rural communities (Cohen, 1980: 208-9). 
The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme seems to include a number of features that 
align with both Ruttan’s (1984) and Cohen’s (1980) understanding of integrated rural development. 
The programme takes a multifaceted approach, emphasising the agricultural sector as a driver of 
development, while also encouraging economic activity in the industrial and financial sectors and a 
broadening of the economic base in rural areas generally. It also aims to expand access to basic 
services, develop infrastructure and provide development opportunities for rural citizens themselves 
(DRDLR, 2009a: 13-22), all driven by “proactive participatory community-based planning” rather 
than simple “interventionist” policy (Ibid, 3). 
While it is safe to say that the CRDP takes an integrated approach to rural development, it is also 
clear that the programme may be at risk of the pitfalls outlined by Cohen (1980) by attempting to do 
too much at once. 
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3.4.1 | The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme 
The literature on the practical realities of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme 
seems to suggest that coordination was problematic at both the planning and implementation 
stages of the programme. 
Everatt (2004:12), for instance, notes that the ISRDP was implemented shortly after several 
municipal boundaries were redrawn, so that a number of the nodal regions selected were run by 
new district municipalities that had barely set up their offices. He also points to a possible 
contradiction between the intention and likely outcomes of the node selection process. Although it 
made sense to identify the targeted nodes on the basis of the greatest need, these municipalities 
necessarily also posed the greatest challenges in terms of capacity and identifying opportunities for 
economic development, straining the already overwhelmed local authorities beyond their limits and 
making a successful pilot phase an unlikely result (Ibid, 13-14). 
Another mismatch seemed to be evident in the emphasis on anchor projects, chosen as examples of 
the ISRDP’s priorities and plans, which also feature strongly in one of the DPLG’s first annual reports 
after the programme’s implementation (DPLG, 2003). These projects, including the building of dams, 
development of tourism routes or reserves, among others, were chosen because of the positive 
spinoffs they could potentially bring (PSC, 2009:15). Building a dam could help sustain agriculture in 
the region while also creating jobs in the construction sector, for instance. It was unclear, however, 
what set ISRDP anchor projects apart from any other kind of development project (Ibid, 16). 
Everatt (2004:14) notes that the programme was in real danger of losing its focus as an overarching 
strategy to improve coordination across horizontal and vertical planes of planning, in favour of the 
“low hanging fruit” offered by these more specific anchor projects. Even those tasked with 
implementing the ISRDS were confused by them, since it made the programme seem more like a 
regular, stand-alone development agenda than a strategy to coordinate existing projects and 
programmes (Everatt, Dube & Ntsime, 2004:2). Anchor projects, in other words, provided a 
distraction from the programme’s primary goal, coordination, while simultaneously undermining its 
perceived efficacy, since its outcomes were indistinguishable from other development initiatives. 
Part of this problem seemed to lie in the fact that the ISRDP had no funding of its own. Sector 
departments like Water Affairs were effectively asked to allocate funds for ISRDP projects that might 
not further their own objectives – in practice, these departments were more likely to fund their own 
agendas (PSC, 2009:59-60). The ISRDS had no carrot or stick to offer for sector departments aligning 
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with its objectives, nor did the DPLG, which also lacked the authority that the Presidency or the 
National Treasury could have wielded over sector departments. 
The ISRDP not only had to compete with sectoral objectives, but also with parallel, funded initiatives 
such as Project Consolidate, aimed at strengthening and supporting local government in improved 
service delivery (Ibid, 67). Although the July 2003 Cabinet Lekgotla noted the need for a financing 
protocol to allocate resources to the ISRDP nodes and attempted to address this inherent weakness, 
the PSC report is sceptical about whether the programme eventually managed to improve 
integration and coordination as intended (Ibid, 16-17). 
Capacity at local government level was still part of the problem – if the capacity to coordinate a 
housing or water infrastructure project wasn’t available at local government level, the planning 
function was shifted away from the municipality to sector departments. As such, the report warns of 
the risk of creating parallel structures for coordination at local level, outside of the existing IDP 
processes. Since local governments already “lack(ed) the authority to act as an organising nexus”, 
their objectives would easily be sidelined in favour of sectoral departments’ in such a scenario (PSC, 
2009: viii, Everatt, Dube & Ntsime 2004:8).  
This lack of authority also had an impact at other levels of coordination, as illustrated by the 
performance of individual national nodal champions, most of whom were also national ministers. A 
2004 report by the Independent Development Trust to the parliamentary committee on public 
works noted that ministers ultimately chose for themselves how involved they wanted to be. Some 
of those who were invested often chose to abandon broader goals for their own department’s 
interests in the relevant node. In these situations, the local government stakeholders were simply 
outranked and unable to ensure a more holistic approach was taken (PMG, 2004). 
Lastly, the “simplistic” coordination mechanisms proposed by the ISRDS, including 
interdepartmental task teams, seemed to function better as channels for relaying information rather 
than the coordination of decision-making. These teams ultimately made no strategic decisions 
around planning, objectives, projects or the allocation of funds, and therefore didn’t have much 
influence on coordination at all (PSC, 2009: ix). 
With no new funding allocated and existing structures simply tasked with producing more 
coordinated implementation, the report summarises the ISRDS’s seemingly confusing vision as, “do 
the same things, only better”, without clear guidelines for improved coordination processes (PSC, 
2009: ix). Beyond the evaluation of these mechanisms, the programme’s practical outcomes were 
deemed “varied” but “generally...modest”. 
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A 2004 study by the IDT did find that most public servants interviewed thought that the programme 
had helped them work differently, with clearer guidelines on prioritising local objectives and a 
greater likelihood of securing funding for certain delivery goals, while also having some technical 
support available through the IDT and DPLG. But the “idea of inter- and intra-sphere coordination” 
still needed translation into a clear set of practices for role players from all three spheres to commit 
to (Everatt, Dube & Ntsime, 2004:28). 
Aliber et al (2006:51) also found that some gains were achieved, primarily in redirecting funds to the 
ISRDS nodes, “fast-tracking infrastructure investment and service delivery” and creating some 
temporary jobs, but this progress was considered to be relatively uneven amongst the different 
nodes. In addition, its failures were often a result of poor coordination – its primary goal. Aliber et al 
(Ibid) also point to a “failure to recognise the limitations of ‘developmental local government’” in 
areas with poor development potential, as well as a lack of skills and “confusion about the roles of 
actors in the various spheres of government” as key weaknesses (Ibid).  
The ISRDS therefore suffered from having no clear line of authority, except where it relied on already 
beleaguered local government structures to coordinate planning and budgeting processes. Not only 
did the DPLG fail to coordinate from the top down, but the odds were stacked against local 
government as an alternative driving force. From a network perspective, referred to earlier, there 
were no bargaining chips or incentives (financial or otherwise) that could be used to secure 
cooperation, nor did they enjoy any authority over the other spheres of government. As such, sector 
departments’ behaviour degenerated into departmentalist behaviour, with each role player pursuing 
their own agenda. 
3.4.2 | The role of local government in the ISRDS 
The post-1994 vision for local government, specifically developmental local government, was first 
set out in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998). This document cast municipalities in a 
coordinating role, noting that many different agencies, both national and provincial, as well as 
parastatals, community groups and organisations and the private sector have the potential to 
contribute to local development. Without proper coordination, however, their collective efforts 
could come to nothing (Ibid, 24). 
More specifically, local government authorities’ Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are considered 
an important tool for “developmentally-orientated” and coordinated planning by the local, 
provincial and national spheres of government (Mello & Maserumule, 2010:289). Although local 
government is seen as close to its constituents and therefore also more likely to identify 
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communities’ needs correctly, the lack of capacity and resources in this sphere of government 
severely limits its ability to deliver services and drive development as intended (Pillay, 2009). 
IDPs, for instance, are defined as five-year strategic plans, reviewed on an annual basis after 
consultation with communities and other stakeholders (Mello & Maserumule, 2010:289). They’re 
expected to outline strategies for achieving all kinds of ambitious goals, from reducing poverty to 
improving service delivery, all while improving the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of 
local government structures (Ibid, 290). By some estimates, however, almost 90% of municipalities 
in the country are unable to “develop credible IDPs” to begin with (Ibid, 284). How could they secure 
collaboration or buy-in for these plans if there is limited or no capacity to even develop them at local 
government level? 
Even if the capacity to develop these plans did exist in all municipalities, Mello & Maserumule (2010) 
point to several obstacles in the way of effective coordination between the spheres of government. 
Local government’s annual budget cycle begins on the 1st of July, while national and provincial 
government’s cycles start on the 1st of April, for instance. While IDPs are developed for a 5-year 
timeframe, national and provincial government use the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF)’s 3-year rolling expenditure cycle. Both are significant signs of misalignment and complexity 
in budgeting cycles alone (Ibid, 291). 
With sector-specific departments such as Water Affairs or Land Reform having greater capacity and 
greater budgetary resources, local government continued to be easily relegated to sidelines by 
planning authorities at provincial or national level (PSC, 2009:13). Sector departments are also loath 
to participate in IDP processes, often sending junior representatives with no mandate to contribute 
or make commitments to participate in the required coordination meetings. It is this lack of 
participation that creates even further misalignment between local and other spheres (Mello & 
Maserumule, 2010: 291-2). 
Although the ISRDS (2000) sought to utilise IDPs as a means of coordinating the rural development 
agenda at a local level, the reality proved fraught with many obstacles. A report by the Public Service 
Commission on the practicalities of the ISRDS and its attempts at improving coordination in rural 
development traces the difficulties and challenges of coordination back to the Constitution, which 
created the framework for independent spheres of government.  
Even though the Constitution also attempts to balance this out with calls for cooperative 
governance, an imbalance of power exists, with local government often drawing the short straw in 
collaborative efforts:  
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In the context of independent and equal spheres of government, the authority to drive and enforce 
alignment with common and focused rural development imperatives is absent...The prevailing 
assumption is that all sectors...would be willing to sub-ordinate themselves to priorities, objectives, and 
interests that transcend or even diminish current areas of control. Without a strategic framework, and a 
driver for it, integration and coordination remains a transactional exercise between different spheres 
and institutions of government and their predetermined plans and budgets. Local government and IDPs, 
in this context, lack the authority to act as an organising nexus. (PSC, 2009:15) 
The PSC report (2009:79) therefore advocates for integrated policymaking at district level as an 
additional link to local planning processes. The Department of Local and Provincial Government’s 
report on the ISRDS also outlined the important role of so-called nodal champions at district level, 
although in practice these individuals also had other responsibilities and could not focus solely on 
ensuring the success of the programme (DPLG, 2008:15, 20).  
The ISRDS’s vision of using existing projects and institutional arrangements to further the goals of 
rural development more or less collapsed in the face of capacity shortcomings at local government 
level and the lack of funding and authority invested in driving the programme’s objectives, 
highlighting the need for investing in both budgetary allocations and institutional capacity for this 
kind of programme in the future.  
A study of the ISRDS conducted by the Independent Development Trust (Everatt, 2004:6) found that 
60% of government officials interviewed thought their municipalities lacked the capacity (defined as 
“technical expertise, administrative skills, project management skills and funding”) to implement the 
programme. Ironically, Everatt (2004:7) points out, initiatives exist for the purpose of building this 
capacity, but their implementation was badly coordinated, so that most ISRDS nodes never enjoyed 
the benefits of such a programme. 
Throughout the report it is clear that local government struggles “intervening in the planning and 
resource allocation processes” of both provincial and national spheres (Ibid, 8). It seems to be a 
continued struggle to get officials from other spheres to participate in IDP processes, to the extent 
that some local authorities don’t even invite them to do so anymore (Ibid, 19-20). As far as political 
champions were concerned, only two thirds of respondents confirmed that national champions had 
visited the nodes they were meant to promote (Ibid, 26). Provincial champions’ performances were 
also varied, but ultimately respondents noted positive results where both provincial and national 
champions became involved (Ibid, 27). The effective participation of political champions therefore 
seems to mitigate the deficiency in authority and capacity at local government level to some extent. 
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The lack of alignment in planning and budget cycles is also noted in this study, with local government 
officials saying that national budgets are often completed before IDPs, so that it’s almost impossible 
to include IDPs in that process (Ibid, 10). When there is money available, it can come in disruptive 
and damaging forms, as evidenced by “dumping” of provincial budget allocations at the end of the 
year – funds are allocated to poorly planned projects that might not even be ready for 
implementation so that they’re not forfeited in the next budgeting cycle (Ibid, 11). 
IDPs are designed to produce a much more collaborative approach to the coordination of the 
planning and budgeting processes of the three spheres of government, along the lines of O’Toole 
and Montjoy (1984) and Peters’ (1998) network perspective, outlined earlier in this chapter. 
Unfortunately, the necessary negotiation does not seem to occur on a level playing field. Even 
though local government is central to the development of IDPs, it seems to lack the capacity and 
clout to drive this coordination in practice. 
3.5 | Summary 
From the above overview of policy interventions and research findings relating to rural 
development, it is clear that the practical realities of rural areas have proven much more 
complicated than anticipated by policy makers in the first 15 years of democracy in South Africa. 
From identifying land reform beneficiaries to finding appropriate land for redistribution, to the 
support of small-scale farming and changes in the broader agricultural sector – each step adds its 
own unique challenges to the agenda. Without clear goals, policy priorities and lines of authority, it 
becomes very difficult for the relevant agencies to coordinate their activities effectively. 
Finally, the role of local government has been identified as crucial, but not yet used effectively in 
practice, whether through the ISRDP or through regular Integrated Development Planning processes 
at this level. Past experience seems to suggest that some investment in resources and capacity 
would be needed in order to support coordination of rural development initiatives from this sphere 
of government. This would also have to be accompanied by a clear lead agency or, at the very least, 
rewards for participation or penalties for not participating in local planning processes. Clear 
communication around policy priorities, with coordination as one of these goals, is also essential – 
where there is confusion, role players tend to default to departmentalism.  
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Chapter 4: Research methodology 
4.1 | Introduction 
This chapter will outline the research methods employed in examining policy coordination in the 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP). A full-scale study of the national 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme and its implementation was neither feasible nor 
within the scope of this thesis. However, the qualitative approach, research design, data collection 
and analysis techniques described below were chosen with the aim of providing both an in-depth 
analysis of one particular case study, as well as relevant information that may apply to the 
institutional arrangements of the CRDP broadly, not just at Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape. 
4.2 | Research Approach  
A qualitative research approach was chosen because of the flexibility it offered, allowing for the 
initial pursuit of broad, open research questions, which could later be refined during the data 
collection process (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:136; Cresswell, 2014:4). As is typical of this approach, the 
study would have to acknowledge and illustrate the complexity of a given situation, while 
simultaneously using inductive reasoning to build “from particular to general themes” (Cresswell, 
2014:4).  
This approach would ultimately lend itself to a detailed description of the CRDP’s unique institutional 
arrangements and chosen coordination mechanisms, allowing room for the evaluation of these 
mechanisms and the way they function and interact in practice and acknowledging the experience of 
the role players tasked with implementing and using these mechanisms.  
4.2.1 | Research Design  
Initially, a comparative study of multiple CRDP sites within a specific province was considered. 
However, this was later deemed neither practical nor feasible given the funds and time available to 
the researcher. Instead, a single CRDP site was identified as appropriate for use in a case study.  
Leedy & Ormrod (2010:137) suggest that single cases with “unique or exceptional qualities” can still 
enhance understanding and “inform practice” in other, similar cases, even though one cannot 
assume that the findings at one implementation site will be universally applicable to all others. 
The town of Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape, located near the South African border with 
Namibia, was one of the first two CRDP pilot sites chosen by the new national Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform. The community at Riemvasmaak is also the beneficiary of one of the 
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oldest successful restitution claims in the history of South Africa. The town has subsequently 
enjoyed a long history of government support and coordinated development efforts.  
Although these features make Riemvasmaak quite a unique case, it also presents the opportunity to 
study CRDP implementation over a longer period of time. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the 
town’s history has given it a political profile probably not common amongst other CRDP sites, while 
its status as a pilot project likely meant that it benefited from a carefully considered planning 
process. If political buy-in and planning processes are deemed to be insufficient at Riemvasmaak, in 
other words, it is probably fair to assume that other CRDP sites won’t be doing better on those 
counts.  
Note that the Northern Cape is the largest of South Africa’s nine provinces, occupying 30,5% of the 
country’s landmass, but housing the smallest proportion (2,2%) of its population (Stats SA, 2012). 
Roughly 25% of the province’s citizens are estimated to live in the province’s rural areas (Stats SA, 
2003). Both the region’s size and the dispersion of its population across the province therefore pose 
a considerable challenge for policy coordination. 
Although it was not the main consideration at play, the principal language spoken in Riemvasmaak is 
Afrikaans, which is also the author’s mother tongue. If the author were not fluent in Afrikaans, this 
would’ve been considered a substantial hurdle in the data collection process. 
4.2.2 | Research instruments 
The primary research instrument employed in this study is a series of qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews conducted with officials and stakeholders from the various spheres of government 
involved in implementing the CRDP, often with specific knowledge and experience of the projects at 
Riemvasmaak. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured set of questions, with the 
intention of exploring the personal perspectives and opinions of the participants as they arose in 
conversation (Cresswell, 2014:190). 
Observations were also recorded during a two-day site visit to Riemvasmaak, while several official 
documents were reviewed as part of an attempt to trace both the processes and progress of 
development in the town. This includes, but is not limited to the original CRDP policy framework, a 
development framework report drawn up by the DRDLR on Riemvasmaak, the CRDP strategy 
document for the Northern Cape, as well as the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of the Kai !Garib 
Municipality. 
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4.2.3 | Research Participants 
Officials at national, provincial and local government level, as well as community representatives 
(the local ward councillor and trustees of the Riemvasmaak Community Development Trust 
included) were selected as participants for both face-to-face and telephone interviews. Information 
gathered in informal conversations with residents was used to adapt and refine the initial set of 
semi-structured questions for formal interviews, and also proved helpful in verifying certain 
statements made by officials. 
Participant name Position Affiliation 
Official 1 Director National Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform 
Official 2 Chief Director Northern Cape regional office of the 
DRDLR 
Official 3* Senior official working in rural 
development* 
 
Northern Cape Department of Agriculture, 
Land Reform and Rural Development  
Official 4 Director: Planning and 
Development 
Kai !Garib Municipality 
Official 5 Ward Councillor Kai !Garib Municipality 
Official 6 Assistant to ward councillor Kai !Garib Municipality 
Official 7* Senior official working in 
agriculture* 
Northern Cape Department of Agriculture, 
Land Reform and Rural Development 
Trustee 1 Trustee Riemvasmaak Community Development 
Trust 
Trustee 2  Trustee  Riemvasmaak Community Development 
Trust 
* The participant requested not to be identified by name. 
Although most participants consented to being quoted with their names and official positions 
included in this thesis, the decision was taken not to include all of this information in the text itself. 
Several participants had mentioned strained relationships between different stakeholders as an 
issue at Riemvasmaak. Considering that this dissertation will be made available online and quotes 
easily attributed to individuals directly identified in the text, therefore, their names have been 
excluded here. Job titles were included or amended to be less specific in the table above, depending 
on the specifications and requests of the participants. 
The direct references in chapter 5 have been amended to show the affiliation of individuals without 
making them easily identifiable. Their affiliation in this sense remains important, however, as it 
illustrates whether they are making observations from the perspective of national, provincial or local 
government.  
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4.3 | Data collection and analysis 
Interviews were conducted over a four week period, with a site visit for the purpose of observation 
and face-to-face interviews conducted in Riemvasmaak and Kakamas over two days. Official 
documentation related to the implementation of the CRDP nationally, and specifically at 
Riemvasmaak, was collected and studied over several weeks and months in preparation of the site 
visit. 
Interviews were analysed by following Tesch’s (1990, quoted in Creswell, 2014:198) approach to 
coding. This involved identifying relevant topics within particular interviews, allocating codes to each 
topic, and coding all interviews with the intention of finding recurring themes in all the interviews 
conducted. This proved to be a helpful tool in not only identifying shared opinions on the CRDP, but 
different perspectives on the same mechanisms, as experienced at local, provincial and national 
levels of government. 
4.4 | Ethical Considerations  
As the research involves human subjects, an application for ethics clearance was submitted to and 
approved by the Department of Political Studies in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of 
Cape Town.  
A sample information sheet and consent form are both attached here as appendices.  These were 
presented to interview participants via email or in person and discussed prior to the interview. 
Participants were asked to stipulate how they prefer to be cited in this thesis, whether by name, 
position or in a way that will not allow them to be identified by co-workers and colleagues. The 
majority of subjects were happy to allow their names to be used. Permission to record said 
interviews was also granted by all participants before proceeding with a particular interview.  
Informal conversations with five different residents of Riemvasmaak were used to inform certain 
questions to interview participants, and to provide context to projects, including the relationship 
between the two settlements at Riemvasmaak and competing perspectives about particular projects 
implemented in the communities. It was decided not to follow a formal interview and consent 
process after the individuals in question indicated that they were not specifically aware of the CRDP 
as a policy framework. Although their perspectives proved valuable in evaluating the outcomes of 
the CRDP, it was not deemed necessary to subject them to a full interview, as the object of study 
was ultimately the coordination mechanisms employed by the CRDP.  
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4.5 | Possible limitations  
The most obvious limitation of the case study as research design is that one cannot assume the 
findings in a single case are generalisable to other cases – in this context, to other sites where the 
CRDP is being implemented. However, the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation’s 
(2013b) report on the implementation of the CRDP allows for some comparison between apparent 
broad trends and the specifics at Riemvasmaak.  
The report studies 18 different CRDP sites, the first two launched in each province, including 
Riemvasmaak itself. It’s also based on more than 100 key informant interviews and over 50 focus 
groups involving as many as 500 CRDP beneficiaries in total. As such, it is a thorough study of the 
implementation of the CRDP across provinces at a time when the number of active sites was starting 
to grow rapidly. 
Due to time constraints, the site visit component was limited to only two full days in the 
Riemvasmaak and Kakamas area. Observational data, although very useful in the context of the 
interviews conducted, offer only a single perspective at a particular time, and cannot address any 
developments over the long term. 
The intended number of key informant interviews was between 5 and 10, with the potential for a 
focus group of beneficiaries included in that sample. It was decided, however, that the focus group 
itself may be of limited use if community members did not have direct knowledge of the 
coordination mechanisms of the CRDP.  Although the total number of participants does fall within 
the intended range (7 officials, 2 trustees), it is still a relatively small sample. There is some danger in 
extrapolating from individual interviews, for example, by assuming the experience or opinion of a 
provincial official is representative of all officials at provincial level. 
Despite the relatively small sample and the specific focus on officials tasked with rural development 
rather than other sectors, the chosen participants’ positions and direct involvement in the 
implementation of the CRDP mean they have specialist knowledge of the programme in broad terms 
and at Riemvasmaak specifically. Participants also demonstrated a willingness to engage critically 
with the structures of the CRDP, suggesting that the risk of bias in favour of the programme, despite 
their close involvement, is low. 
4.6 | Summary  
As the policy review in Chapter 2 has shown, rural development has formed a part of South African 
policy goals since 1994. It was only as recently as 2009, however, that a national department had 
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specifically been tasked with this mandate, paired with the long running land reform agenda. 
Chapter 3’s literature review illustrated some of the complications and failures of past rural 
development efforts, especially when it came to coordinating efforts between departments, and 
between different spheres of government. 
The research methodology outlined in this chapter was chosen to form a critical assessment of the 
coordinating mechanisms in the new national department’s flagship policy, the Comprehensive Rural 
Development Programme, with a specific focus on the case of Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape. 
The aim is to examine the efficacy of the coordination mechanisms used by the CRDP, in view of 
previous policies that pursued similar objectives.  
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Chapter 5: Research findings 
5.1 | Introduction 
This chapter outlines the information gathered in the process of following the research methodology 
discussed in chapter 4. This includes a descriptive overview of the CRDP’s policy design and 
background information on the history of rural development in Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape. 
Most importantly, it provides a detailed overview of the themes emerging from the interviews 
conducted with key role players in the implementation of the CRDP at that particular site. 
5.2 | Descriptive overview of the CRDP 
5.2.1 | Establishing a new national department of rural development 
Rural development emerged as a key policy priority at the African National Congress’ 2007 policy 
conference in Polokwane. Discussion documents from this conference are critical of previous land 
reform policies, predicting that they are unlikely to achieve their target of redistributing 30% of 
viable agricultural land by 2014. Not only did the conference resolve to devise a better, more 
effective and efficient land reform policy, it also emphasised the importance of locating such a plan 
within a broader strategy for rural development (ANC, 2008). 
After the general elections of 2009, a new national Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform was established to spearhead this agenda, absorbing the former Department of Land Affairs 
(DLA). Although the DLA had functioned as an independent department, this move meant a split 
from its former partnership with the Department of Agriculture under the same ministry. 
The DLA, tasked with the sizeable mission of redistributing 30% of the country’s agricultural land by 
2014, enjoyed an almost 80% increase in its budgetary allocation over this period, receiving R3,7 
billion for its projects in 2006/2007 (DLA, 2007) and R6,6 billion in the year 2007/2008 (DLA, 2008), 
suggesting a renewed emphasis on the land reform agenda even before the DRDLR was established. 
Rural development, food security and land reform also formed part of the strategic priorities 
identified by Cabinet in its 2009-2014 Medium Term Strategic Framework (The Presidency, 2009a). 
In the DLA’s annual report of 2008, however, the department’s Director General argued that even 
the increased budgetary allocation was insufficient, considering the enormity of the 30% 
redistribution goal and the cost of appropriating land for this purpose (DLA, 2008: 5). In his last 
annual report for the DLA and in a briefing to parliament in the same year, the DG also emphasised 
the need to ensure that redistribution is not the primary goal of land reform, but that the success of 
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these projects are judged on the appropriate selection of beneficiaries and the effective provision of 
post-settlement support (ibid and PMG, 2008). 
Moving from the last reports of the DLA to the first produced by the new DRDLR, it’s clear that the 
new department was given a more expanded mandate, although the new agenda seems to align 
with the DG’s concerns around a more holistic approach to the land reform process. “Whilst the 
redistribution of 30% of white-owned agricultural land remains the core objective of the land reform 
programme,” the report reads, “it has now been linked to a clear programme of support and 
capacity building that would ensure socio-economic development of all land reform beneficiaries 
(DRDLR, 2010:6)”.    
Previous DLA reports had referenced the need for coordination (DLA, 2007:9) or implied it, as in the 
Director General’s comments above, but the new department emphasised coordination as central to 
its mandate and its approach to rural development. 
The new Minister of Rural Development and Land reform, Mr Gugile Nkwinti, providing an overview 
of the new department’s expanded mandate to parliament in 2009, noted that the DRDLR would still 
employ fewer staff members than its predecessor. He explained that the new department was not 
envisioned as a “standalone” entity taking on this new mission, but that it “had been charged with 
the mandate to initiate, facilitate and coordinate rural development amongst other departments in 
order to promote a more...coherent approach to rural development (PMG, 2009a).” 
The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme was the DRDLR’s flagship project for achieving 
these objectives, and was described as “being an effective response against poverty and food 
insecurity by maximising the use and management of natural resources to create vibrant, equitable 
and sustainable rural communities” (original emphasis, DRDLR, 2009a:9). 
In short, the new DRDLR was tasked with a wide range of responsibilities, straddling agrarian 
transformation, rural development and land reform, with no additional resources allocated, and with 
the understanding that policy coordination would be essential to whatever strategy it chose to 
achieve its objectives (DRDLR, 2009a:13).  
The importance of policy coordination in this new approach is also implied by the fact that the CRDP 
is both spatially located (i.e. focusing specifically on rural areas) and ‘comprehensive’ in its scope. 
Both of these aspects point to the crosscutting nature of the programme, in terms of its diverse 
target population and its diverse goals, which stretch across the agricultural, land reform and 
development sectors. 
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“Within the CRDP,” one passage in the DRDLR’s first annual report reads, “the department has 
played the role of catalyst, coordinator, initiator and facilitator. The focus in each site has been on 
ensuring coordination between sector departments and tiers of government. In most areas, this has 
enabled us to achieve our objectives without necessarily spending the funds originally allocated” 
(DRDLR, 2010: 7). 
5.2.2 | Overview of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme 
The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme Framework outlines the CRDP’s three 
interrelated objectives and strategies: 
– Coordinated agrarian transformation, changing the “power relations” between communities and 
land or other natural resources, and building and developing a vibrant agricultural sector, explicitly for 
the benefit of the community (DRDLR, 2009a:13). 
– Increased rural development, which is thought to be at least partly driven by agrarian 
transformation, particularly when it comes to communities benefiting from the natural resources at 
their disposal. Beyond agriculture, however, the programme also aims to address infrastructure 
backlogs, expand access to services, provide leadership training and even promote social cohesion 
(Ibid, 14-15). 
– Improving on the implementation of land reform policies. This includes faster redistribution, land 
tenure reform and settlement of restitution claims, modernising the systems used to administer these 
claims and expanded definitions of potential beneficiaries. Ideal beneficiaries may include a variety of 
groups, from black commercial farmers to landless households needing land for subsistence farming 
(Ibid, 16-20). 
Across these objectives, the rural employment creation and skills training model would also aim to 
meet basic needs, foster entrepreneurial development and eventually establish or grow the rural 
industrial and financial sectors (Ibid, 21-22). 
None of these objectives deviate strongly from past policies’ intentions. In fact, the CRDP is very 
similar in its mission statement to the ISRDP. However, the framework does seek to distinguish the 
CRDP from its predecessors by pointing out that it will be driven by “proactive participatory 
community-based planning” rather than simply “interventionist” policy (Ibid, 3). As such, it aims to 
consult with local communities about the most appropriate interventions and to take the approach 
most suited to these communities. This is arguably still very similar to the ISRDP, which sought to 
consult with communities via the Integrated Development Plan process at local government level 
(The Presidency, 2000a). 
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The CRDP framework also notes the inherently crosscutting nature of the policy on the vertical 
plane, pointing out that rural development is listed as a concurrent function of national and 
provincial government, while local government will also have to be involved in governing the affairs 
of particular communities (DRDLR, 2009a: 6-7). 
Following two pilot projects run at Giyani in Limpopo and Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape, the 
CRDP Framework notes that horizontal, interdepartmental collaboration and sharing of resources, as 
well as coordination and project management duties, are essential to its success. It is also stated 
that CRDP projects must align with IDPs and other planning processes and strategies, planning must 
have its basis in community participation and coordination will primarily happen at provincial level, 
in consultation with local government structures (Ibid, 12-13). 
Furthermore, the framework lists the various structures to be involved in the implementation of the 
CRDP, and their assigned roles, including: 
- political champions, including the Minister of Rural Development and Land reform at national level, 
and provincial premiers and/or MEC’s tasked with driving rural development at provincial levels 
- a council of stakeholders in each target area, made up of community members from civil society 
organisations, ward committees, school governing bodies etc., as well as government representatives 
from national, provincial and local structures. The CoS is tasked with, among other things, identifying 
community needs, planning projects accordingly and monitoring progress. 
- technical committees, implementing the decisions of the COS and fulfilling a project management 
role. These committees are made up of representatives from provincial sector departments, including 
agriculture and rural development as well as others, depending on the types of projects being 
implemented (e.g. if it is decided that there is sufficient need to establish a clinic at a particular site, 
the department of health will need to be included in this configuration). 
- operational groups / households / cooperatives are also included in these structures, so that there’s 
a direct link between beneficiaries and the technical committees meant to train them and serve their 
interests. 
Once again, this is very similar to the proposed structures of the ISRDP, including nodal champions 
that provide political clout and momentum, and project teams, made up of both government 
representatives and community organisations (The Presidency, 2000a). 
5.3 | Rural development in the Northern Cape 
The Northern Cape is the largest of South Africa’s nine provinces, occupying 30,5% of the country’s 
land mass, but houses the smallest proportion of its population, at only 2,2% (Stats SA, 2012). 
Roughly 25% of the province’s citizens are estimated to live in rural areas (Stats SA, 2003). The 
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region’s size and the dispersed nature of its population potentially pose considerable challenges for 
policy coordination. 
An estimated 63% of the province’s total population lives in poverty, compared to the national 
poverty rate of 56,8% (Stats SA, 2014:31). Where access to basic services are concerned, 51% of 
Northern Cape households have access to flush toilets, 83% have access to electricity and 71,3% 
have access to piped water sources provided by government (Stats SA, 2012).  
Roughly 18% of its households (55 150 households in total) are engaged in agriculture, contributing 
as much as 6% of the province’s Gross Domestic Product – the highest proportion of any of South 
Africa’s provinces. This suggests a relatively vibrant agricultural sector, despite the province’s arid 
climate. 
5.3.1 | Riemvasmaak: A brief history 
The town of Riemvasmaak, located close to the South African border with Namibia, offers an 
interesting case study for land reform and rural development as national policy priorities. Not only 
was it selected as one of two pilot sites for the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme in 
2009, but it is also the location of one of the earliest and most publicised land reform and restitution 
cases settled in the early 1990s.  
Official records note that the inhabitants of Riemvasmaak had settled there by the 1870s, but oral 
history suggests they had already been living in the area for many decades, mostly likely even long 
before that (Smith & Bozalek, 1993:3). It is thought that conflict in areas further north, during the 
earlier parts of the 19th century, had led several Nama, Damara and Herero families to settle south of 
the Orange river, with Xhosa-speakers driven to the same area by conflict to the south (Ibid, 
Erasmus, 2003:8). 
By all accounts, Riemvasmaak had developed into a vibrant, diverse community by the 20th century. 
Although the area was never officially designated as Native Trust Land, Smith & Bozalek (1993: 11) 
suggest that the region was effectively treated according to the principles of such a classification, 
with the community engaging in and managing farming and grazing activities by themselves. 
As a former mission station, the majority of the community considered themselves Christian, and 
valued the good mission schools in the area. Despite the arid climate, sheep, goats and cattle were 
successfully kept in large flocks, while the fertile banks of the Orange river allowed for vegetable 
gardens and other crops to be grown (Erasmus, 2003:13). 
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By 1973, there were over 1500 people of Damara, Xhosa and mixed origins living together in the 
community. But Riemvasmaak had been designated a “black spot” under apartheid legislation – a 
term given to areas where black people were living outside of designated urban or homeland 
(Bantustan) areas (SPP, 1993). 
Being identified for removal, however, also meant that community members were classified 
according to their racial heritage, in order to determine where they should be resettled. As such, the 
community was split into three different groups. Those classified as Xhosa were moved 900 km away 
to the Ciskei in what is now the Eastern Cape, while those of Damara heritage were moved 1 300 km 
to the Khorigas region in the north of Namibia. Those classified as “coloured” were resettled in the 
township areas of Northern Cape towns like Upington (SPP, 1993). 
Besides the obvious trauma of such an extreme disruption and destruction of community life, 
Riemvasmakers faced many obstacles in their new homes. Local communities resisted accepting the 
newcomers, and resented the Riemvasmakers for putting additional strain on resources, while 
disease killed off their livestock (Erasmus, 2003: 25-26). Meanwhile, their former homeland became 
a testing site for the South African Defence Force (SADF), with a portion incorporated into the 
Augrabies National Park. 
By the early 1990, the community decided to mobilise to reclaim their land, launching an effective 
campaign even before South Africa became a democracy, and with their community networks 
spread hundreds of kilometres apart. The Commission on Land Allocation ultimately found in their 
favour in February 1994, and the first families returned to the area in January 1995 (Ibid, 34). 
The Riemvasmaak Community Development Trust was established to hold and manage the land on 
behalf of the community, including a portion of land that remains under the purview of the South 
African National Parks (Sanparks) authority. This trust has been a longstanding source of conflict 
within the community, including disagreement about the chosen trustees, funding priorities, project 
management, alleged mismanagement of finances and nepotism (Erasmus, 2003:38-41). The 
continued unhappiness eventually culminated in the criminal investigation and conviction of two 
trustees for embezzling roughly R650 000  from the trust (Timse, 2014). 
Despite the fact that Riemvasmaak was one of the earliest examples of successful restitution in land 
reform, which brought with it the promise of development and resources for the area, the town was 
once again identified as an area in need of development support in 2009. As such, it became one of 
two pilot sites for the newly designed Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. The 
community of Riemvasmaak is therefore not only of significance as a result of its remarkable history, 
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but also because it has a long term perspective on rural development efforts over the first 20 years 
of democracy. 
A proposed draft framework for Riemvasmaak, compiled by the DRDLR before the implementation 
of the CRDP, notes some progress in terms of the provision of basic services such as housing, water 
and electricity supplied to the residents. Despite the limited grazing capacity of the arid landscape, 
the community was already engaged in livestock farming on a subsistence level, as well as a table 
grape growing project of roughly 10 ha, maintained by the community trust (DRDLR, 2009b:20-
22,33-34). 
These improvements aside, however, the report estimates that as many as 75% of community 
members receive social grants (Ibid, 40). In fact, an earlier study suggested that just over 50% of 
households relied solely on state pensions as a source of income (Erasmus 2003: 40). The DRDLR 
report suggested that the area’s tourism potential (DRDLR, 2009b:39-41), along with further 
communal agricultural activities (Ibid, 51) should be explored as potential sources of income. 
In an overview of existing plans and projects for the area, the report outlines intentions to develop 
infrastructure, including access roads, rainwater collection and improved sanitation facilities in the 
area’s existing Integrated Development Plan (IDP) (Ibid, 44-46). Sector department plans seem to be 
limited mostly to the expansion of agricultural activities, with the exception of the Department of 
Water Affairs, which was planning a water pipeline worth 13,5 million to the area at the time (Ibid, 
47-48). 
5.3.2 | Riemvasmaak: Observations and situational analysis 
Riemvasmaak is made up of two, separate settlements, with the main settlement colloquially known 
as Sending (“Mission”, after the Catholic mission station) and the second settlement, Vredesvallei, 
located about 16 or 17 kilometres away. Although the whole community was originally resettled at 
Sending, ethnic divisions and other disagreements seem to have led to the split, with Xhosa 
Riemvasmakers ultimately moving away and establishing the second settlement in the late 1990s 
(Erasmus, 2013:35-38). 
Sending is located a full 60 km away from the nearest town, Kakamas, and accessible by a relatively 
good quality2
                                                             
2 The quality of the road is defined here as being accessible by vehicles without four wheel drive capabilities. 
 dirt road, with the final 8 km stretch of road leading into and through the settlement 
now tarred. The site visit was conducted soon after heavy rains had fallen in the region, causing 
substantial damage to the road, with maintenance work still continuing several days later. An 
interview with the director of planning and development in the local municipality later revealed that, 
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although the maintenance of the road was the responsibility of the Department of Public Works, 
municipal officials had to step in from time when the road is badly damaged, as they did on this 
occasion (Official 4, Kai !Garib Municipality). 
Sending and Vredesvallei are connected by a dirt road, which had been rendered virtually 
impassable by regular vehicles by the same heavy rains referenced above. Driving from Sending to 
Vredesvallei therefore meant a nearly 2 hour detour via Kakamas and Augrabies, through the 
Blouputs farming area, although the route from Kakamas to Vredesvallei was a tar road, which made 
for relatively fast travelling speeds. 
Both settlements are made up primarily of RDP houses and informal corrugated iron structures. Both 
settlements also boasted relatively new sports grounds and –facilities, including soccer fields. 
Although the sports facilities at Sending were access controlled, with a locked gate and signage 
indicating when the swimming pool would be open, the soccer field at Vredesvallei’s gates had been 
left open, with livestock grazing on the small patch of grass growing on the pitch. 
Both settlements also have a small municipal office with adjacent postal facilities, a computer centre 
and small library. Signage listing the contractual details of development projects was dotted 
throughout both settlements. In Sending, the most noticeable new development was a brand new 
clinic, although the nursing sister stationed there also has to service outlying areas, so the clinic is 
not open every day of the week (Officials 5 & 6, Kai !Garib Municipality).  
In casual conversations with a handful of residents not employed by the municipality, nobody 
recognised the CRDP as a specific policy programme, although they were aware of IDP processes and 
the Community Works Programme (CWP). The CWP, an initiative of the Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs, employed about 70 people from the community at Sending to 
help out with odd jobs around town, whether by cleaning the community hall or assisting families 
during bereavement (Official 6, Kai !Garib Municipality). CWP workers were easy to spot moving 
around in the town, since they were typically dressed in bright orange overalls provided by the 
programme. 
5.4 | Research findings 
5.4.1 | Observations from the DPM&E (2013) report 
A recent report produced by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation on the 
implementation of the CRDP suggests that the programme has been fraught with a number of 
complications in practice. Most notably, respondents described the CRDP as a “top down national 
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initiative” (despite its focus on community-led development) with limited buy-in from other 
departments, insufficient  support from supposed “political champions” at provincial and local level, 
as well as capacity problems within local municipalities (DPM&E, 2013b:35-36). 
Despite its intentions, the CRDP was found to have achieved very little in terms of coordination, at 
least partly as a result of having a new national department with a perceived lack of authority at the 
helm, but also because of a lack of political will to drive the programme at provincial level, as 
originally intended (ibid, 8). A lack of coordination between the departments tasked with land 
reform and agriculture and the continued misalignment of budget cycles in different spheres of 
government were also noted – a continuation of dysfunctional coordinating relationships noted in 
previous policies such as the ISRDP and Integrated Development Plans generally (Mello & 
Maserumule, 2010:291). 
At local government level, the programme was considered an “added burden” rather than a helpful 
intervention, so that CRDP-related duties were often neglected in practice (DPM&E, 2013b:35). 
Coordination between community structures and government was also flawed, with Councils of 
Stakeholders rarely functioning or even holding regular meetings. Moreover, government 
participation in these structures was haphazard, with junior staff often sent to attend instead of real 
decision-makers – again, a theme repeated from earlier ISRDP and IDP processes generally (ibid, 9 
and Mello & Maserumule, 2010:291-2). 
A lack of local consultation or even understanding seemed to be evident in a number of areas, with 
some fearing that the CRDP was merely implementing “blanket solutions”, instead of adapting its 
use of technologies to reflect local preferences and conditions, particularly in terms of the 
agricultural interventions chosen (DPM&E, 2013b: 47-48). This approach, coupled with a lack of 
attention to post-implementation management or maintenance, resulted in a number of “white 
elephant” projects falling into disrepair (Ibid, 48).  
The DPM&E’s assessment of the progress at CRDP sites implies that the programme has ultimately 
repeated many of the mistakes of past coordination-focused programmes, or at least failed to 
overcome the dysfunctional dynamics of existing coordination structures. It also seems to have 
forsaken, at times, its own community-driven approach, opting instead for “blanket solutions” and 
deliverables that soon turn into so-called white elephants. 
Although the interviews conducted for this thesis provided some corroboration of these broader 
trends, it also showed that all of these problems were not necessarily universally applicable across 
CRDP sites. 
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5.4.2 | The new national DRDLR: Budgeting and planning processes 
Official 1, (DRDLR)3
Funds were allocated in an ad hoc manner, with provincial departments charged with 
conceptualising, planning and “packaging” particular projects that couldn’t be addressed within 
existing budgets. These packaged proposals were then presented to a technical committee within 
the DRDLR and approved by a Deputy Director General of the same department (Official 1, DRDLR). 
, said the new department’s role was to set targets (with input from both 
provincial and local role players), manage budgetary allocations and to oversee performance 
targeting, monitoring and evaluation. At the same time, however, the department partnered with 
and provided support for provincial sector departments and local governments in meeting these 
targets. This support could take many forms, including funding, providing additional staff, or hiring 
technical advisors to assist. 
Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development)4
As I indicated...there is this IDP process, which we take and turn into an implementation plan…we take 
all these particular projects…all those that have budgets, we then consolidate them into what we call 
the implementation plan, and from there on we monitor the particular process…  
 confirmed that technical assistance from 
national departments had been forthcoming, but was careful to characterise the direct funding of 
CRDP projects as more of a “stop gap” measure: 
...in terms of resources, in terms of coordination we don’t need that much…but in some 
instances, when we go to communities, they might want to say that we need a water drain there and 
then, and then we do it from our own budget, but it doesn’t necessarily impact or effect existing 
processes.  
Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality)5
Although Official 1 (DRDLR) admitted that budgeting cycles across the three spheres often proved 
difficult to coordinate, good relationships between provincial and local officials usually helped 
smooth over some of these issues. One way to build and maintain these relationships, she observed, 
was not to send lower level staff to meetings where decisions are being made, an unfortunate trend 
, said he believed that the CRDP had managed to raise the profile 
of rural development priorities during budgeting processes at all levels of government, making it 
easier to coordinate project spending and speeding up implementation.  
                                                             
3 Telephone interview, 29 January 2016 
4 Telephone interview, 22 January 2016. Note that the official in question is part of the rural development 
directorate within the Northern Cape Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development. 
5 Telephone interview, 20 January 2016 and at Riemvasmaak, 26 January 2016. 
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observed in the DPM&E (2013b: 36) report with both CRDP and IDP-related gatherings (Mello & 
Maserumule, 2010: 291-2), since that could easily lead to “miscommunication”:   
You need to send competent managers to [meetings involving officials from the various spheres of 
government, such as IDP forums] and get proper feedback, proper reports. One thing that I found also 
is that there’s poor governance in relation to those structures as well…You know there’s no proper 
minutes of meetings and decisions taken, or you have to wait 2 or 3 weeks [for a report to be 
produced], especially if you send low level staff to one of those meetings, and then you wait for the 
next level manager to make a decision on what came out of the meeting, then it also strains relations at 
that level. 
As far as the DRDLR’s status as a new national department is concerned, participants did not 
consider this to be something that had hampered coordination. Official 1 (DRDLR) pointed out that 
the department’s Director-General had co-chaired an implementation forum for the Medium Term 
Strategic Framework’s Outcome 4 (Economic Development), so that the DRDLR was well placed to 
promote rural development priorities at the national level.   
Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development) also referenced the outcomes-based planning 
approach as a way of securing cooperation from other departments, with programmes of action 
providing a similarly crosscutting planning mechanism. In this case, the relevant objectives are 
“Outcome 7: Vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural communities and food security for all” (The 
Presidency, 2010), and “Programme 3: “Develop and implement a comprehensive rural development 
strategy linked to land and agrarian reform and food security” (The Presidency, 2009b): 
We report on, they call it outcome 7…we present the activities of various departments based on the 
[Medium Term Strategic Framework] MTSF integrated programme that we developed in the province, 
then also formulated within a programme of action. So there will also be a cabinet lekgotla where we 
will be expected to provide a report on progress in the CRDP that will be encapsulated within the 
outcome 7 report that we represent to cabinet and its clusters. Because we usually meet as 
departments…we then consult on various activities, consolidate the report, we send it to the premier 
and send it to national.  
This kind of objective-based reporting is fed upwards to the MinMEC and MinTech forums, where 
coordination issues at lower levels would quickly become apparent, and could be addressed from 
the top down. These forums meet once a quarter, or even as regularly as once every two months if 
there are urgent issues to address (Official 1, DRDLR). Both Officials 1 (DRDLR) and 3 (Northern Cape 
DoA: Rural Development) mentioned these forums as channels for escalating problems, whether to 
secure political buy-in or to ensure coordination between sectors or departments. 
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Officials 1 and 3 also pointed out that several public servants who had previously worked on the 
ISRDP under the former Department of Provincial and Local Government had been redeployed to 
work in rural development. Official 26
Since current president Jacob Zuma replaced Mbeki in a fierce leadership battle at the same 
conference, it makes sense that it was not politically feasible to continue with a policy that was 
clearly associated with Mbeki’s leadership. 
 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) even characterised the 
differences between the ISRDP and the CRDP as largely political, since the ISRDP had been a product 
of the “Thabo Mbeki era”. As discussed earlier, the ANC’s renewed emphasis on rural development 
as a policy priority and the foundation for the new national DRDLR and its flagship policy, the CRDP, 
have their origins in the party’s 2007 policy conference at Polokwane (ANC, 2008:27-31).  
Although the national DRDLR was relatively newly established when it started implementing the 
CRDP, in other words, it’s fair to say that it did not have to justify its mandate from scratch. The 
department could use existing staff to pursue the same set of priorities, but with renewed political 
support, so that it enjoyed more influence than most new departments might have.  
Despite the positive feedback above, Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) did point to some 
dysfunction inherent in the new configuration. Pressure to meet its own targets, he said, sometimes 
created tension between the national departments and provincial sector department. Since the 
DRDLR is expected to redistribute a certain amount of land, for instance, it may do so without the 
provincial department of agriculture’s approval, despite the fact that the latter will be expected to 
provide extension services and support farming activities on that land (Official 7, Northern Cape 
DoA: Agriculture7
Official 7 (Northern Cape DoA: Agriculture) agreed that the line between rural development and 
agriculture had become blurred at times. He mentioned a vegetable garden planned and 
implemented by a DRDLR contractor under the CRDP at Riemvasmaak, without any involvement 
from the provincial department of agriculture, despite the fact that maintaining such a project was 
not the DRDLR’s “strong point”. 
). This tension also makes it tempting for the DRDLR to skip coordination entirely 
and start dabbling in agricultural services itself, despite the fact that it does not have the necessary 
expertise at its disposal (Official 2, DRDLR: Northern Cape Office). 
Although the political support and funding enjoyed by the new department meant it had the option 
to implement its own projects even without buy-in from other role players, the DRDLR runs a real 
risk of encroaching on other departments’ mandates in doing this, duplicating existing programmes 
                                                             
6 Telephone interview conducted on 26 January 2016. 
7 Telephone interview conducted on 10 February 2016. 
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and overspending in the process. In fact, the estimated cost of rolling out the CRDP to the intended 
2920 municipal wards is roughly R61 billion8
Official 1 (DRLDR) said her department had to strengthen its own coordination role and look at ways 
of rolling out the CRDP in a more cost effective way, to “look at cheaper ways of doing things 
without compromising services in those areas”. She said the department was in the process of 
developing a set of norms and standards that would set out the criteria for selecting, evaluating and 
prioritising projects more clearly: 
, almost ten times the DRDLR’s initial annual budget 
allocation (DPM&E, 2013b: 61).  
…you need to curb. I think the norms and standards will go a long way, even to silence politicians at 
that level, who will say ja but my town doesn’t have this, my town doesn’t have that… Then you can 
tell them stats to say it doesn’t make sense, financially, on the fiscus, to have this here. The post 
office and the library are some of the examples where it’s actually a waste of money in some cases, 
because you just get one or two users that go to them, and most of them are online these days…why 
do you invest in them? Rather invest in increasing the bandwidth in those areas for cell phones or 
Smartphone technology, laptops or iPads. 
Even where the DRDLR didn’t step in, however, the combination of ambitious target-setting and 
mismatched budget cycles tended to create unexpected tensions. Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: 
Rural Development) said his department was under pressure to continuously increase the number of 
active CRDP sites every year, while the provincial department wanted to ensure progress at specific 
sites before adding more to the roster: 
You know it takes long to get development, because [it] depends on other stakeholders to budget and 
to implement some of the projects. So we cannot get these results within a period of 1 year. So what 
we are saying is that we should be allowed to have a site for 5 years…you cannot just name targets for 
the purposes of achieving performance outcomes. 
5.4.3 | Provincial government: Driving implementation 
The previous section outlined the role of the DRDLR, driving a rural development agenda at the 
national level and providing support for provincial and local government. Most of the practical 
implementation of the programme, however, fell to the provincial government. Official 3 (Northern 
Cape DoA: Rural Development) outlined provincial responsibilities as follows: 
[After] a site is chosen, we do a status quo report, whereafter we communicate with the municipality 
where the site is chosen. We then take the IDP of that municipality and develop what we call the 
                                                             
8 Based on an average spend of R3261 per capita at the existing 18 sites at the time (DPM&E, 2013b:61) 
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CRDP implementation plan, and thereafter we convene a forum called the CRDP technical forum, we 
then convene all the relevant stakeholders, we then present a particular implementation plan. 
Because the implementation plan as it is, is determined by the IDP, will then indicate which 
department is going to contribute with what, on what particular project. And what we then do as 
coordinating role, we monitor, coordinate and report on activities. 
Note that the implementation plan draws from the municipal Integrated Development Plan or IDP 
(more on this process later). Official 3 made it clear that, even though his department had to take a 
very key, overarching coordinating role, local government had to be a part of these processes – no 
development could take place without their involvement, since they were closest to the 
communities being served. 
Outside the DRDLR, the provincial department was the only stakeholder that not only had a specific 
rural development mandate, but allocated human resources specifically to the implementation of 
the CRDP: 
We have two colleagues, the one is dealing with development planning, that’s the person who does 
coordination of the planning of projects for engagement, then we have another colleague who 
establishes the structures. The structures, like the council of stakeholders, that is another thing 
because we didn’t want to burden one individual to deal with the policy as well as the practical 
implementation of the projects. So we have one dealing with it from the policy perspective, and 
another one from the implementation part of it. (Official 3, Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development) 
Even with this dedicated capacity, however, at times it was difficult get all the relevant stakeholders 
to commit to even meeting, especially when it came to the technical forum convened at provincial 
level (Official 3). He said this created anxiety within communities, since they had identified projects 
through the Council of Stakeholders, which were then presented to the technical forum. This raises 
expectations around the technical committee’s ability to deliver these projects. 
It was especially difficult to secure commitments from national bodies without provincial 
representation, such as the Development Bank of South Africa or NERSA (the national energy 
regulator), he said. This was a recurring problem that he was bringing to the attention of the DRDLR, 
which he hoped would implement a kind of stakeholder relations strategy that could secure better 
cooperation from these role players (Official 3, Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development). 
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5.4.4 | Local government: Frustration at the coalface of development  
Officials at local government level seemed to have a very different perspective on coordination and 
what constitutes adequate consultation and input from municipalities. As such, Official 49
There were issues with interdepartmental relations as well, and generally the communication and 
reporting processes were not sufficient (Official 4, Kai !Garib Municipality). Official 2 (DRDLR: 
Northern Cape Office) noted that there was always a kind “subtle tension” between municipalities 
and provincial sector departments when it came to joint planning or coordinating implementation. 
Different role players and departments wanted to be seen delivering projects, he noted, so they 
might not be delivering what was needed, or coordinating their efforts with others. Official 4 (Kai 
!Garib Municipality) said local government had to help prioritise and plan appropriately: 
 (Kai !Garib 
Municipality) felt the CRDP had “a slight intergovernmental relations problem” in the sense that 
local municipalities were not always included in the design and planning phases of projects, or even 
in the choice of projects at provincial and national level. Although municipal IDPs were used a basis 
for planning, this did not automatically translate into municipal involvement in decision-making.  
When we need to decide what to do, the municipality must be a part of that, because we are…we’re 
on the ground, we hear directly from the people. Otherwise it’s the white elephant plan – you plan 
the wrong project in the wrong place, then it should have been here and not over there, but it also 
shouldn’t have been that thing in the first place. 
Ideally, he added, the CRDP should have a project manager based at Riemvasmaak, operating from 
the municipality, who could coordinate and report on different projects and activities. 
The problem is with the management of the thing, it’s too loose. There isn’t control, or sufficient 
control. In other words, there isn’t enough reporting happening. So if there were someone driving or 
coordinating on the ground, it would be better. You can’t manage a project [at Riemvasmaak] from 
Kimberley. 
Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) even questioned why rural development was 
conceptualised as a national competency, and said he might have suggested that rural development 
directorates are created at municipal level instead, with sufficient oversight to ensure that the 
money allocated for rural development is not spent elsewhere. That would help eliminate projects 
that “[don’t talk] to one another”. When asked why he thought local government was not given the 
opportunity to drive the CRDP agenda in the programme’s current format, he said that 
municipalities are often thought of as “not necessarily [being] well staffed”, or suspected of 
                                                             
9 Interviewed in Kakamas, 26 January 2016. 
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misappropriating the funds allocated to them – in short, they were not being trusted with such a 
role.  
Part of the reason why this caused frustration with municipalities was because the maintenance of 
many of these new assets in the community was left up to them10
The computer centres at Sending and Vredesvallei seemed to be further examples of such 
coordination failure. The latter was not functioning at the time of the site visit because the centre 
did not have electricity. The centre at Sending had also had issues with its internet service provider, 
so that neither could be used for their intended purpose. Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) said he 
was looking for alternative service providers that were based nearby, since the original one was in 
Cape Town, which made it difficult to fix the problems they encountered quickly. 
. The planning process for the 
sports grounds built at Vredesvallei, for instance, had not considered maintenance at all. “We asked 
someone to go look after it,” Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) said, “But there’s no groundskeeper 
because there are no tools or equipment – you need [specialised equipment] to irrigate a field like 
that.” Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) agreed that this was a problem, and said projects 
were not being conceptualised properly. “If your conceptualisation was correct,” he said, “you will 
take care of it, you will ask yourself your question, who is going to take care of that?” 
Official 1 (DRDLR) said she was aware of the fact that municipalities regard this kind of expenditure 
as “unfunded mandates”, and that Memorandums of Understanding or Intergovernmental Relations 
protocols attached to projects would probably help resolve some of this tension. She said that this 
had worked well at other projects, including one in Beaufort-West in the Western Cape: 
You can’t just say we’re building something here but it’s going to be handed over…what is your role 
and what is my role going forward? Then you need to agree before the ground is dug up for any kind 
of work, you need to agree on who is doing what once the structure is up and running. 
Besides preventing this kind of oversight during planning, Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) also 
suggested that involving local government could help departments prioritise better, as opposed to 
just picking projects they’d prefer from the Integrated Development Plan. He pointed to the 
impracticality of including a swimming pool in the sports facilities at Sending, for instance, when the 
town had to have its water pumped in from almost 40 kilometres away and the already arid farming 
region was suffering from widespread drought. Instead, he said, the money could’ve been used for 
                                                             
10 Although these projects may feature in the municipality’s IDP, Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) pointed out 
that municipalities “can never fund [the entire] IDP”. Since they rely on sector departments to fund certain 
projects, the assumption seems to be that maintenance costs are included in those departments’ budgets, or 
the lack of budgeting for maintenance costs at IDP level could also be a result of poor communication around 
the selection of projects at provincial level.  
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proper sanitation, land development in preparation for additional RDP houses or by extending the 
tar road into the town by a couple of kilometres – all projects that would’ve been highly valued by 
the community. 
Despite these problems, Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development) had acknowledged the 
importance of municipalities as the “nearest representatives of their communities”, as mentioned 
earlier. Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) also felt that local government and the community at 
Riemvasmaak had been informed about projects and involved in the planning processes, at the very 
least through the use of the IDP already drawn up by them. It is possible, in other words, that local 
government had not deliberately been excluded, but the questionable prioritisation of certain 
projects seems to indicate that they had not been given the opportunity to apply their local 
knowledge and experience in more holistic, integrated planning processes. 
Even if the above problems were addressed, however, the CRDP still put municipalities in an 
awkward position with their own development planning processes. “[It] creates a type of inequality 
within the municipality,” Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) said, “Since some areas are being 
privileged, while others are not.” 
5.4.5 | The role of political champions 
When asked about the role of political champions, participants indicated that politicians could 
contribute greatly to the implementation of the CRDP, but their involvement also generated some 
negative side effects.  
Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) shrugged off the question when asked how often political 
champions had visited Riemvasmaak, saying it was not necessarily important for politicians to be 
involved:  
…Even if the president never comes to Riemvasmaak, it’s local government that’s responsible for 
holding IDP meetings, community meetings, that has to provide feedback at council meetings where 
resolutions are made. That’s the process. 
On the whole, Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) felt that “the lines of communication are open” for 
him as ward councillor, and any other councillor, if they’re willing to take things up with the right 
people: 
…we have an open door relationship with officials at local government, at district level or provincial 
level. The link of communication goes through that channel, and the channel forwards it and forwards 
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it. I have direct contact with the executive mayor of the district, I have direct contact with the premier 
of the province…from my side, I can contact anyone…with the premier or the MEC. 
Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) said that political champions like MECs and mayors could 
help ease some of the tensions between officials by securing “compliance” from all government 
departments. The risk still exists, he added, that these role players could use their influence just to 
promote projects that made them look good – it depends on that particular politician’s worldview. 
It is possible that Riemvasmaak’s history had given it a political profile not likely to be matched at 
other CRDP sites. According to Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development), the fact that this 
had been the first site in the Northern Cape meant that both the premier and the MEC were 
involved in workshops around the original implementation plan. In fact, he said that both the MEC 
and the national minister had become involved in conflict resolution within the community after 
disagreements arose over certain “community projects”, although he clarified that this had not been 
related to CRDP projects specifically.  
It has also been reported that both the Minister and Director-General of the DRDLR had visited the 
community during the disputes and legal action taken against trustees of the town’s Community 
Development Trust (Timse, 2014). The disagreements are discussed in more detail below, but serve 
to illustrate that political champions have been quite actively involved at Riemvasmaak at various 
junctures of planning and implementation. It seems unlikely that these officials would ultimately be 
willing or able to offer this kind of hands on support at hundreds of CRDP sites. 
5.4.6 | The Council of Stakeholders (CoS) 
At the time these interviews were conducted, the Council of Stakeholders at Riemvasmaak had not 
met for about 6 months (Officials 4&5, Kai !Garib Municipality). According to Official 5, this had not 
always been the case: 
[Initially], the momentum was good, good, good, but lately it’s been moving slower and slower, until 
now we can see that there is a gap. It’s a problem, but the gap doesn’t mean that we don’t have 
contact with each other, but it is important for role players to sit around the same table to discuss 
things. Everything over the phone isn’t always as comfortable as when everyone is looking each other 
in the eyes, so there is a gap [where the meetings were]. 
Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) felt that good project management practice required monthly 
meetings, but this was unlikely to happen in the current setup. Before CoS meetings, he said, 
officials would often have to send out staff to check on the progress of certain projects first, so that 
a report could be compiled, and then various reports would be presented at the meeting and 
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compiled into one before being presented to the community. This creates the impression that those 
reporting at the meetings did not necessarily have up-to-date, first-hand knowledge of what was 
happening on the ground, which also limited how useful the forum could be.  
Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) remarked that it seemed as if Riemvasmaak was being run 
through the provincial technical committee rather than the CoS, but that if the CoS was operating 
properly, the CRDP intended for things to be the other way around. At the time of the site visit, 
Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development) also happened to be involved in a workshop with 
trustees of the Riemvasmaak Community Development Trust to discuss the functioning of the CoS 
and community representation in this forum, suggesting that they were hoping to improve the way 
the council functions going forward.  
Although most officials interviewed did not consider lack of attendance from any particular 
stakeholder to be an issue, as it had been flagged in the DPM&E (2013b) report, the CoS was not 
functioning as intended. It is also not clear what value the CoS added in terms of community 
representation,  considering that the ward councillor was already running IDP meetings on a regular 
(almost monthly) basis, according to Officials 5 & 6 (Kai !Garib Municipality). Official 6 said 
community members also attended these meetings regularly, because they knew “if they don’t 
attend, the council won’t know what their needs are…[this way] we reach outcomes faster.” 
Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) also pointed out that local IDP representative forums included the 
district municipality, provincial departments, representatives of the MEC’s office and sometimes 
even national departments, if they needed to report on specific projects in the area. In other words, 
both community participation processes and reporting structures for coordinated development 
already existed outside of the CoS. 
Official 1 (DRDLR) said she thought it was time to re-evaluate the role of Councils of Stakeholders in 
the CRDP: 
We shouldn’t be setting up alternative structures to what already exists in the province, especially if 
it’s working well, even though it may not be in our control11
                                                             
11 Although the CoS is arguably not under the ‘control’ of the DRDLR either, the department may enjoy more 
influence in a forum that is explicitly focused on the CRDP and the rural development agenda, compared to 
broader development planning.  
. So for instance I’m referring to IDP 
structures, where we, in fact, are supposed to plan with local government through their structures, in 
order to get coordination and the timing right as well. So I would think then we need to strengthen 
those structures and build cordial relations within those structures.  
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Even if these systems were not working properly, she added, it was important to figure out what was 
going wrong before setting up new structures. She said she was aware that most IDP processes did 
not involve sufficient community participation, but that the precise issues needed to be identified: 
You need to know why you are doing this, what are the problems here, so you don’t go and put 
structures upon structures, and then those people don’t know what they’re doing, and why they’re 
doing it… If it’s strong enough and it’s working in that area, leave it alone, there’s no reason to 
interfere, we need to work with them, align with them and integrate. 
Official 1 (DRDLR) also noted that the CoS, tasked with identifying the needs of communities at CRDP 
sites, planning and monitoring progress, has no legal status of its own, while IDP forums and even 
Communal Property Associates or trusts like the one at Riemvasmaak are legislated bodies. CPAs and 
trusts often already had relationships with local municipalities, so that the CoS was just another, 
parallel structure on top of that. 
She recounted other types of problems experienced with Councils of Stakeholders across the 
country. In certain areas of the Western Cape, for instance, conflict between supporters from 
different political parties made it difficult for the CoS to function. There were also incidents of “elite 
capture”, where an influential person such as a chief or business leader may attempt to use the CoS 
to steer government funding towards projects they themselves would benefit from. Setting up the 
wrong kind of structures in the wrong way, in other words, could play into local conflicts rather than 
resolve them. 
Trustee 212
Official 5 said the trust and local authorities worked well together and they would help each other 
when possible. For example, the cemetery at Sending had recently been expanded using leftover 
wire from a fencing project on the trust’s land. During the interview with Trustee 2, however, he said 
one thing that shouldn’t happen, is that leaders from local government and the trustees “shouldn’t 
criticise one another in public”, suggesting that there had been some tension between the two 
bodies after all. 
 said that the CoS needed to keep everyone informed, and that this would reduce conflict 
in the community. In fact, the CoS could play a key role in bringing together the trust and municipal 
officials, who were both there to represent the community’s interests. While the municipality took 
responsibility for service delivery in Riemvasmaak itself, the trust was ultimately responsible for the 
development of the surrounding land, which it owned (Official 5, Kai !Garib Municipality). 
                                                             
12 Interview conducted in Kakamas, 26 January 2016. 
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In a way, then, it seems as if the CoS not only duplicated existing structures, but provided a new 
platform for competing interests to play out, which in turn made it difficult for the CoS to fill its 
intended role as coordinating mechanism. 
5.4.7 | Tensions within the community 
There are a number of complications evident at community level that cause conflict and adds a level 
of complexity to project planning and implementation in forums like the Council of Stakeholders. As 
mentioned earlier, Riemvasmaak is made of two separate settlements, at Sending and Vredesvallei. 
Trustee 113
Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) described the community as “divided” and “prone for conflict”. 
One of the flagship projects of CRDP coordination and collaboration, the brand new clinic at Sending, 
has been a source of great unhappiness in Vredesvallei, for instance. Although there were plans to 
upgrade the mobile clinic services at Vredesvallei (Official 6, Kai !Garib Municipality), they currently 
had to make do with receiving health services in an old shipping container.  
 explained that Riemvasmaak was really made up of two separate communities, and that 
those who were supporting the community can’t duplicate all projects at both settlements, which 
created tensions that spilled over to the trust and to government departments involved in these 
projects. Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) also said there was a “thick line of division” 
evident in the community. “Even today when you go to a meeting there,” he said. “If the meeting is 
at Sending, the people from the other area will say to you no, they cannot come.” 
Both Officials 1 (DRDLR) and 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) said that poor communication could 
be a part of the problem. If government and community leaders did not communicate clearly about 
what was being done, why and how, this easily led to “restlessness” and conflict. Official 2 also felt 
that the trust had poor track record when it came to doing this, fuelling suspicion of 
mismanagement. Trustee 2, however, said it seemed like the trust “never wins”, no matter what it 
chooses to do – there were lots of competing opinions about how the trust should manage its assets 
and income. 
Still, Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) felt that the distance between the two settlements should 
not be a factor, and said it was his responsibility to hold quarterly meetings at Vredesvallei (he is 
based at Sending). In the meantime, residents were welcome to lodge complaints or report 
problems at the municipal office there, which he aimed to resolve on a biweekly basis. Although he 
admitted that there were sometimes “interpersonal issues”, he said the community knew that they 
would lose out if they didn’t stand together. “You’ll never get everyone to agree 100%, but in any 
                                                             
13 Interview conducted in Kakamas, 26 January 2016. 
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case, the government’s approach is that we keep going,” he said. “You can’t stand still because of 3, 
4 or 5 people, and then development stands still [at the same time].” 
Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) felt that these conflicts simply reflected the lack of opportunities 
and dire circumstances in the town.  “Poor people and unemployed people remain unhappy people, 
stay angry people, and they remain injured,” he said.  “They remain aggressive.” 
Official 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development) said that instability meant departments were 
becoming wary of investing in projects because they were afraid the structures might be vandalised. 
He said the same staff member who dealt with establishing the Council of Stakeholders and similar 
structures for the functioning of the CRDP was tasked with addressing social cohesion and 
development in the area: 
…our analysis is, if you keep them busy you know, with the projects and engagement, then there will 
not be those tensions emerging in the community. So what we are trying to do is to make sure that 
we engage with the community much more aggressively in ensuring that everyone benefits, and is 
happy around the processes. 
5.4.8 | Physical infrastructure vs. Development projects 
During the interview process, most participants with direct knowledge of developments at 
Riemvasmaak repeatedly referenced physical infrastructure – the clinic building, the new 
prefabricated buildings that will hold the new police station, the section of road that had been 
tarred into Sending, the flush toilet system at Vredesvallei, the pipeline providing water from 
Khamkirri on the Orange river to Sending when residents had previously had to rely on boreholes. 
While the CRDP did aim to address infrastructure backlogs and expand access to services, Officials 2 
(DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) and 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) pointed out that this was only a part 
of the programme’s intended impact: 
The service delivery component is fine, but the poverty issue hasn’t been addressed…employment 
hasn’t been addressed, which means per capita income remains the same, zero base or whatever, 
and the household incomes remain low. (Official 4, Kai !Garib Municipality) 
With a small, poor community like that, he pointed out, there is no point in trying to establish large 
businesses where there is no market for them. “In a community like this, there’s nothing else, it has 
to be agriculture,” he added. Community members had been divided up into cooperatives, with 
sectoral focuses like tourism, mining and agriculture, but Official 5 (Kai !Garib Municipality) said 
everyone within a cooperative didn’t always work together to get the help available to them. 
Riemvasmaak had also received kraal facilities for livestock farmers, who could use them when they 
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had to bring animals in from the veld to be branded or dipped, but these had fallen into disrepair 
(Official 6, Kai !Garib Municipality). 
Official 4 (Kai !Garib Municipality) felt that the issue with these projects was an operational one. The 
community at Vredesvallei have had a small vineyard right next door since the late 1990s, on the 
banks of the river running by the settlement, but during the site visit the vines were bare in 
comparison to other vineyards in the area, where grapes had clearly been harvested for the 
production of raisins:  
Now it looks like people weren’t trained properly, that they don’t have this farming thing in their 
hearts. Someone might want to go into business, might want the land, but he can’t work the land – 
that’s another thing.  Can you manage and use the land efficiently? That’s the problem you see there. 
And that thing’s main goal was to generate income, economic empowerment for the people there. 
And that’s the gap, it didn’t happen. (Official 4, Kai !Garib Municipality) 
Official 7 (Northern Cape DoA: Agriculture) said he wouldn’t necessarily say that the community 
didn’t take ownership of the project, but those who were looking after the vineyard wanted to earn 
salaries doing so. “When it came to harvest time,” he added, “anybody could cut the fence and take 
a few bags full and disappear. They never really managed to generate much income from it.” 
Without some form of income being generated, community interest in the project dwindled. The 
department ultimately stopped investing in it when the high electricity costs associated with the 
project’s water pumps became prohibitive. 
Official 2 (DRDLR: Northern Cape Office) agreed that the agricultural component was “the only thing 
that is bothering [government] at Riemvasmaak…there is nobody sustaining it, it is like we have all 
moved out. Probably if we could sustain the momentum we would’ve gone a little bit [further].” 
Official 7 (Northern Cape DoA: Agriculture) pointed out that projects targeting existing farmers, such 
as the 46 000 ha land allocation handed over to livestock farmers at Riemvasmaak, worked well and 
needed little input from the department after an initial investment in infrastructure on the farms. 
However, he said, projects involving groups of people rarely worked, because self-interest usually 
took over. 
As an example, he mentioned another, recent project also aimed at growing table grapes near 
Vredesvallei. Intended to benefit a newly established community cooperative, the project had failed 
to get off the ground after the beneficiaries had insisted to be made owners and “not just 
labourers”. The provincial department had initially planned to appoint a contractor to run the 
project, with a handover or exit strategy planned after training the beneficiaries over time, but the 
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land would ultimately still belong to the trust, which left the beneficiaries unhappy. His department 
decided that it was too risky to invest millions of Rands in a project that may soon be abandoned 
anyway, and nothing more ever came of it. It was not that these projects were not being considered 
or budgeted for, in other words, but they clearly ran into difficulties when it came to negotiating 
terms with the community and specific beneficiaries. 
In attempt to start their own businesses and create jobs outside of agriculture, some of the younger 
community members had clubbed together and applied for government tenders as contractors or 
subcontractors, usually related to the construction work like building road infrastructure or 
constructing government buildings. They were not considered to have enough experience, however, 
or high enough ratings to qualify for these contracts, so that the jobs available to Riemvasmakers 
were mostly low level, as labourers (Official 4, Kai !Garib Municipality). 
In short, the benefits of the CRDP and other development programmes at Riemvasmaak were 
limited to improved service delivery and physical infrastructure, while real long-term improvements 
in economic opportunities for Riemvasmakers were still missing. 
The findings of the DPM&E (2013: 45-47) report seemed to indicate similar issues arising at other 
CRDP sites. Concerns around the types of jobs being created were the same in all of the sites 
studied, from the short-term nature of employment to the low wages. It was also not clear that 
beneficiaries were developing skills that would make them more easily employable in the future. 
Some interventions, such as community food gardens, seemed effective in producing positive 
results, specifically improving household food security. Broad-based agrarian reform and expanded 
land reform both seem out of reach of this particular programme, with agricultural interventions 
mostly focusing on subsistence producers (ibid, 46-47). 
5.5 | Summary  
This chapter provided a thorough overview of the CRDP and its intentions, its implementation track 
record so far, and specifically the way it had been implemented in Riemvasmaak, in the Northern 
Cape. Participants seemed confident that, even though the national department was newly 
established, rural development was enjoying substantial political support as a policy priority. Joint 
planning and reporting processes also seemed to provide the department with opportunities to 
make its voice heard and to secure cooperation from other stakeholders. 
Although provincial government had succeeded in driving the implementation of the programme, it 
might have done so at the expense of local government involvement. A senior local official pointed 
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to several issues with planning and prioritisation, with local government often left to deal with the 
consequences. A dedicated project manager at municipal level may well help to keep the CRDP’s 
focus on delivering the most important services, projects and other interventions. 
As unique instruments of the CRDP, political champions seemed to fulfil their role much more 
effectively than the Council of Stakeholders. The council was branded a duplication of existing 
structures, and one that provided additional kindling to fuel conflict within communities rather than 
communicating clearly and driving development on behalf of the community. 
The fact that the community was, in fact, divided into two separate settlements, and had other long-
standing sources of disagreement amongst themselves, was a complication left unaddressed by 
CRDP structures. The programme ultimately delivered some improvements in service delivery and 
physical infrastructure, but officials were doubtful that the programme had made a long-term 
impact in residents’ economic prospects. Although it was not the aim of this study to evaluate the 
impact of the CRDP at Riemvasmaak, it is worth pointing out perceived failures where they may be 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 | Introduction 
This final chapter considers the findings detailed in Chapter 5 and places them within the broader 
policy context and literature on rural development in South Africa. Did the CRDP succeed in 
promoting coordination in the pursuit of rural development as it intended to, and if not, why not?  
6.2 | Discussion of findings 
RESEARCH QUESTION: How has the implementation of the CRDP been influenced by its co-
ordination mechanisms? 
Unlike earlier policies like the ISRDP, the CRDP was driven by its own national department, at a time 
when rural development was touted as one of the national government’s 5 key priorities, along with 
education, health, job creation and lowering crime rates (Zuma, 2009-2013). The CRDP also had its 
own budget, even though these funds were allocated on a relatively ad hoc basis (Official 1, DRDLR). 
Previous development efforts under the RDP and the ISRDP had similar structures, driven at national 
level by the RDP Ministry and the Department of Provincial and Local Government respectively, 
which fits with Peters’ (1998:298) “top-down” conceptualisation of coordination. 
In the RDP’s case, however, its national structures were dissolved in the mid-1990s, leaving the 
policy without a clear driving agency or ministry. Even while the RDP ministry was active, the RDP 
Fund was made up of contributions from individual line departments’ allocated budgets, creating 
some resentment among these departments and undermining the RDP office’s ability to use the 
money as a bargaining chip for cooperation and coordination. After all, sector departments were 
applying for funding from a budget they had effectively funded themselves (Kraak, 2011:351 and 
Blumenfeld, 1997:75). The ISRDP also struggled to enforce coordination from the top down, partly 
because it lacked any funding of its own, and partly as a result of the DPLG’s perceived lack of 
authority to enforce coordination from the top down (PSC, 2009:59-60).  
In contrast, therefore, the CRDP had a better carrot (budget allocations) and stick (political fallout 
for non-compliance) to drive coordination. Unfortunately, this created a new challenge – where the 
DRDLR couldn’t secure cooperation, it was possible to step in and simply fund its own interventions 
instead (Official 2, DRDLR: Northern Cape Office). This might have been useful to ensure progress on 
particular projects, but also made the programme seem unaffordable and wasteful, duplicating 
existing functions already housed in other departments.  
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This will be even more of a liability going forward, as recent State of the Nation addresses focus 
more strongly on broader issues like slow economic growth and job losses, and no longer make 
direct references to rural development programmes (Zuma, 2013-2015). The 2015 State of the 
Nation Address did mention a new DRDLR initiative called “Agri-Parks”, which focuses on stimulating 
and supporting agricultural production, agro-processing and other related activities in rural areas 
(Zuma, 2015) – a mandate that sounds very similar to the gaps in economic development and job 
creation identified in the CRDP by officials interviewed, but one that also hinges heavily on buy-in 
and cooperation from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). This programme 
was allocated R2 billion in its first year, which represents nearly 25% of the DRDLR’s annual budget 
of roughly R9,45 billion (Nkwinti, 2015). 
Although Official 1 (DRDLR) said that Agri-Parks and the CRDP should not be conflated, with the 
latter taking a much broader view on rural development while the new programme focused 
specifically on agricultural activities, it does seem like a risky and expensive addition to the DRDLR’s 
agenda when the true long-term cost of the CRDP has not yet been formally evaluated. It also seems 
to perpetuate a dysfunctional expansion of the DRDLR’s mandate in lieu of effective coordination 
with DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture. 
As far as other policy coordination mechanisms go, the provincial technical committee seemed to 
fulfil its steering role effectively, although it would have benefited from more consultation with local 
government. A project manager at local government level, or even improved coordination with 
municipalities, would go a long way to ensuring that planning and prioritisation match the 
community’s needs, without burdening local government with unwanted or badly planned projects 
to manage (Official 4, Kai !Garib Municipality and DPME, 2013:85). This would also be in keeping 
with Leupolt’s (1977:9,14) conceptualisation of integrated rural development, which favours 
“administrative decentralisation” as a way of embracing complexity at the local government level 
and ensuring that development efforts remain relevant to the needs of rural communities.  
Political champions also seemed mostly to serve improved coordination, although it was noted that 
Riemvasmaak enjoys a political status perhaps not common among CRDP sites. It is not clear at all 
that political champions are as effective at promoting coordination at other locations.  
The Council of Stakeholders, on the other hand, seemed clearly redundant, if not destructive in its 
design and implementation. Officials agreed that the councils were duplicating existing IDP 
structures and processes, despite the fact that policy coordination literature emphasises efficiency 
and avoiding duplication (Peters, 1998:296). The fact that its efforts were poorly coordinated also 
undermined its position as a communication channel for the residents of Riemvasmaak, fuelling 
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existing tensions and conflict in the community and making it even harder to coordinate effectively 
with the beneficiaries of development efforts. 
SUB-QUESTION 1: To what extent do the CRDP’s co-ordination arrangements align with existing 
mechanisms at local government level, such as Integrated Development Planning processes? 
Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) were still relatively new when the CRDP’s predecessor, the 
ISRDP, was implemented, but the programme identified these plans drawn up at local government 
level as a key mechanism for coordination. Unfortunately, it seemed these structures struggled to 
overcome obstacles like mismatched budget cycles, predicted by theorists like Moseley (2009:22-
23), limited capacity and resources at municipal level and local government’s general lack of 
authority when it came to securing contributions from provincial and national government (Mello & 
Maserumule, 2010 and  PSC, 2009:15). 
Still, the IDP process came up continuously in discussions around the implementation of the CRDP at 
Riemvasmaak. The community was aware of how the IDP functioned and purportedly participated in 
its processes on a regular basis (according to Official 6, Kai !Garib Municipality). The ward councillor 
was also active in organising community meetings and had confidence that the IDP representative 
forums would offer opportunities to engage with provincial and national department officials 
(Official 5, Kai !Garib Municipality). Outcomes-based planning, Mintech and MinMEC forums also 
featured clearly as effective forums for escalating coordination issues, in interviews with both 
Officials 1 (DRDLR) and 3 (Northern Cape DoA: Rural Development). 
It would seem as if the CRDP was mostly integrated very clearly into existing planning processes and 
structures, with the exception of the Council of Stakeholders, which seemed like a less effective 
version of existing IDP processes.  
Perhaps integrated planning processes have improved since the implementation of the ISRDP, 
although admittedly Mello & Maserumule’s (2010) findings indicate that, as a rule, IDPs still don’t 
generally function effectively as tools for joint planning by the different spheres of government. 
Even so, Official 1 (DRDLR) still considers the CoS a needless duplication – it makes more sense to 
focus on strengthening and supporting IDP processes where they are weak, than to duplicate them 
via this flawed forum. Experience from the ISRDP also suggests that creating parallel structures 
outside of existing IDP processes tends to undermine the role of local government, which “lack(s) 
the authority to act as an organising nexus” in those non-IDP forums (PSC, 2009: viii). 
It should be noted that the CRDP might not have integrated as well with existing forums without 
widespread political buy-in around rural development as a policy priority, or without a national 
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department to raise its political profile. It is not clear that the programme could have been 
implemented through existing structures without them, or without at least some budget of its own 
to spend. 
SUB-QUESTION 2 : If coordination efforts did break down during the implementation of the CRDP 
at Riemvasmaak, what are the dynamics that contributed to such a breakdown?  
The most obvious case of coordination failure seems to have occurred on the vertical plane, with 
limited involvement and consultation with the local municipality. Although the exact cause of the 
breakdown is not clear, it would seem as if longstanding misalignment between the land reform / 
rural development and agriculture portfolios, outlined by Cousins (2013:47), has also continued 
under the CRDP. Now that rural development had its own budget, however, it seems tempted to 
jump in and invest in agriculture itself. Sustained support of those efforts in the long run, however, is 
still out of reach of the department’s current resources.  
It remains to be seen whether new initiatives like Agri-Parks will secure better cooperation between 
the two departments, or if the DRDLR is simply duplicating efforts by the national Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, despite its own lack of expertise in the field. 
The conflict within the community at Riemvasmaak is also a sizeable obstacle for any coordination 
efforts to overcome, and still falls outside the scope of the policies like the CRDP. This type of 
complication is not new, as was documented in the discussion of dynamics at Impendle (Drimie, 
2003) and Dwesa-Cwebe (Ntshona et al, 2010). There is no evidence that the CoS at Riemvasmaak 
was undermined by competing policy objectives, as coordinating mechanisms in these examples 
were, but a combination of divisions within the community, a history of disappointing development 
efforts and mistrust in the management of the town’s financial affairs meant that some projects 
were halted, while resources and political capital had to be expended to resolve these conflicts. 
All of these factors added a new dimension to development efforts that most officials were not 
prepared for. Without dedicated capacity for resolving these conflicts at grassroots level, most 
stakeholders withdraw or give up rather than risk investing in failed projects. Perhaps the suggested 
addition of a project manager at local government level may serve to address these recurring 
obstacles in development efforts, if not directly through project management efforts, then at least 
by improving communication at grassroots level. 
 6.3 | Conclusion 
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Considering the above findings, it is clear that the coordination mechanisms at Riemvasmaak did not 
successfully promote policy coordination in the implementation of the CRDP. Further research by 
the DPM&E (2013b) also suggests that some of these observations ring true at other CRDP sites 
across all nine provinces. At the very least, it is important to consider the suggested improvements 
to CRDP structures outlined in these findings, including: 
- Dissolving the Council of Stakeholders as coordinating mechanism and providing support for 
improved Integrated Development Plans to be drawn up at local government level. 
- Improved involvement of local government officials through these strengthened IDP 
processes, as well as during planning and implementation at provincial level. 
- Appointing a dedicated project manager at local government level, serving as an improved 
communication mechanism with the community, while also monitoring progress on the 
ground. 
Continuing with the CRDP as it stands is risking a substantial financial investment in an ineffective 
policy programme.
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Information Sheet for Research Participants 
 
Title of research project:  
A critical assessment of policy coordination in the implementation of the Comprehensive Rural 
Development Programme. 
 
Nature of the research: 
It is my intention to investigate and understand the implementation of the CRDP in the Northern 
Cape province specifically, including any new institutional arrangements put in place, as well as 
policies or structures aimed at promoting collaboration between government departments. I am also 
aiming to compare the CRDP to previous cross-cutting initiatives that would have required a high 
level of coordination between government departments from the local, provincial and national 
government spheres, such as the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (2001). 
            I am interested in rural development and the CRDP in particular because of the policy’s status 
as the flagship initiative of a relatively new national department, hoping to improve the lives of 
some of South Africa’s most vulnerable communities. 
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Telephone 082 394 2137 Email anneliemare@gmail.com 
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What are the implications of your involvement in this interview / project? 
*** The researcher may explain these to you verbally in more detail, if needed *** 
 
The research will form part of a dissertation submitted to the University of Cape Town in partial 
fulfillment of my degree requirements and will therefore be publically accessible both in the UCT 
library and online. As such you may stipulate in what capacity you want to be quoted in the 
dissertation, whether I may identify you personally by name, by position or in some other, less 
specific capacity, since the publication of the dissertation will create a degree of public exposure to 
you personally. 
              You are free to withdraw your participation at any point during our correspondence, and 
may also choose not to answer certain questions. I should not require more than an hour of your 
time and will schedule the interview at a time that is convenient to you.  
Information should include: how long it will take, how the information will be used, participants’ roles and rights (including 
the right to skip questions or withdraw without penalty at any time), any anticipated risks/benefits which may arise as a 
result of participating, any costs or payment involved (stipulate, even if none). 
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